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This thesis explores how porous borders have exacerbated terrorism in Uganda. 
Since the last terrorist attack in 2010 by Al Shaabab, Uganda has not experienced a 
significant terrorist incident. Still, the threat remains real and constant because of the 
situations on Uganda’s porous borders. For example, the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) 
terrorists still operate cells in the country, and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) poses a 
threat from across the South Sudan–DRC–Uganda border.  
This thesis looks at how Uganda’s law enforcement agencies secure the country 
without undermining legitimate economic and social activities conducted through the 
borders. Because porous borders are, by definition, an international concern, this study 
also explores the regional cooperation and coordination mechanisms in place between 
Uganda and its regional partners on the one hand, and between Uganda and the 
international community on the other hand. Ultimately, the study finds that, given 
Uganda’s geopolitical location as a land-locked country, the borders will remain more or 
less porous. The way forward is to evolve systems that will manage this porosity to the 
benefit of law and order in Uganda. 
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On the night of June 11, 1998, the Allied Democratic Front (ADF), a Ugandan 
rebel force of Islamic extremists based in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
infiltrated Uganda on its western border and attacked students at Kichwamba Technical 
Institute by setting dormitories ablaze. More than 80 students were burned to ashes and 
more than 60 others seriously injured; many more went missing.1 The porous, 
mountainous Uganda-Congo border facilitated the terrorists’ ability to infiltrate Uganda, 
attack the institute, and retreat to their safe havens in the eastern DRC.  
On March 1, 1999, members of the Liberation Army of Rwanda (ALIR), 
comprising forces that carried out the genocide in Rwanda in the early 1990s and now 
based in the DRC, infiltrated Uganda in the southwest and launched a terrorist attack on 
foreign tourists in Bwindi National Park. The reason for the attack was to punish the 
United States, Britain, New Zealand, and Uganda for their support of the regime in 
Kigali.2  Some 20 tourists were kidnapped and marched into the jungles in the Congo, 
where English-speaking tourists were separated and killed with axes, including two 
Americans, four Britons, and two New Zealanders. A Ugandan tourist guide was burned 
to death. In 1999, Rwanda security apprehended three suspects who were turned over to 
the American government in March 2003 for trial.  
On July 11, 2010, during the World Soccer Championship in Kampala, Al 
Shabaab launched a suicide terrorist attack. During the attack, several people were killed, 
including sixty Ugandans, nine Ethiopians, one Irish woman, and one Asian; some 85 
were wounded.3 Investigations revealed that the terrorists exploited the porous Uganda-
                                                 
1 Human Rights Watch, “HRW Condemns Deadly Attack by Ugandan Rebels on School Children,” 
June 10, 1998, http://www.hrw.org/news/1998/06/09/hrw-condemns-deadly-attack-ugandan-rebels-school-
children.  
2 U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department Announces Indictment, Arrests of Three Rebel 
Group Members for Brutal Murders of Two American Tourists in Uganda, Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Justice, March 3, 2003. 
3 “Al-Shabab Claims Uganda Bombings: Twin Attacks Targeting World Cup Fans in Kampala Kill at 
least 74 People,” Al Jazeera, July 13, 2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/07/
2010711212520826984.html. 
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Kenya border to infiltrate items used in the attacks. Recently, a number of Muslim clerics 
ave been assassinated in Kampala; senior security officials have linked these targeted 
killings to the ADF terrorists, who are still operating across borders.4  
In all these cases, the threat of terrorism in Uganda was exacerbated by borders 
that are under-secured. To be sure, enhanced vigilance by the Ugandan security apparatus 
and close cooperation with regional and international partners in terms of intelligence 
sharing, intelligence training, logistical support, and closer border controls have helped 
lessen the terror threat. Since the last terrorist attack on Uganda in 2010, Al Shaabab has 
made several attempts to launch more attacks, but they have not realized their plans. 
Similarly, while the Congo-based ADF extremists continue to operate active cells in 
Uganda, they, too, have not succeeded in launching combat operations in the country.  
However, the threat remains real and constant—in large part because of the 
situations on Uganda’s borders. Though the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) 
degraded the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and forced the terrorists to flee the republic, 
the South Sudan–DRC–Uganda border is still vulnerable because of the persistent 
insecurity in the DRC and South Sudan. While Uganda has pacified the northeastern 
region of Karamoja after a successful disarmament exercise, its northeast border remains 
vulnerable because Kenya has not conducted a similar disarmament exercise.5  
Furthermore, like the other troop-contributing countries (TCCs), Uganda’s role in 
providing operational and tactical support to the African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), 
continues to position it as a prime target for Al Shabaab.6  Thus, for Uganda, like many 
states in unsettled regions, stability and democracy may begin, literally, at the border. 
                                                 
4 “Kaihura Links Killing of Muslim Clerics to ADF Rebels,” Radio One, December 30, 2014. 
http://radioonefm90.com/kaihura-links-killing-of-muslim-clerics-to-adf-rebels/. 
5 Annette Weber, “Boundaries with Issues: Soft Border Management as a Solution?” Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftug, January 2012, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08869.pdf.  
6 Armada Global, “Uganda Al Shabaab Poised to Strike,” October, 2013, 
http://www.armadaglobalinc.com/docs/uganda_al_shabaab_poised_to_strike.pdf. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines how porous borders have contributed to or exacerbated 
terrorism in Uganda. How could more effective border controls contribute to combatting 
terrorism in Uganda? How does Uganda’s law enforcement apparatus exercise its 
mandate of ensuring secure borders without jeopardizing the smooth flow of goods and 
services upon which the country depends? What is the role of regional cooperation, and 
what are the challenges posed by international cooperation? In sum, the proposed 
research asks how border control fits into a holistic approach to combating terrorism. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
An emerging democracy in East Africa, Uganda is affected by developments 
within the region, whether or not they unfold within Ugandan territory.7 The geopolitical 
location of Uganda as a land-locked country and its proximity in the Great Lakes region 
exposes it to adverse effects of instability in the affected states. For example, the volatile 
situation in the Central African Republic and South Sudan has facilitated the infiltration 
of small arms and light weapons in the region; some of these weapons are likely to be 
accessed by terrorists. For another example, in January 2014, Kenya, Rwanda, and 
Uganda launched a Joint tourist visa aimed at tapping into the more than 50 million 
tourists who visit Africa every year; however, this outreach may not be achieved in the 
face of insecurity in Kenya.8  Following the massacre of 150 students by Al Shabaab at 
Garissa University on April 2, 2015, and other recent terrorist attacks in Kenya, the 
government is now building a security wall along the 682-kilometer border with 
Somalia.9    
                                                 
7 Kivinda Boniface Kilonzo, “Managing Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: A Case Study of Kenya.” 
PhD diss., Nairobi University, 2013), 30. 
8 Uganda Wildlife Authority, “Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda Launch Joint Visa at ITB,” March 6, 2014,  
http://www.ugandawildlife.org/news-a-updates-2/uwa-news/item/340-uganda,kenya,rwanda-launch-joint-
visa-at-itb#sthash.cTr6sFMn.dpuf.  
9 Joseph Burite and Ilya Gridneff, “Kenya Failures on Security Weaken Ability to Fight Militants,” 
Bloomberg Business, April 6, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-06/kenya-
floundering-on-security-weakens-ability-to-fight-militants. 
 4 
The rationale and effectiveness of security walls along borders has been an issue 
of debate among different authorities. From an economic point view, Kenya would have 
to spend about 32 percent of its annual budget to complete a wall along this border—a 
staggering sum, particularly in the context of foregone opportunities for alternative 
investment. As Kilonzo observed, “national resources in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and 
Somalia have been diverted to the security sector in an effort to safeguard national 
territories.”10 Without question, a functional sovereign state must guarantee the security 
of its people, but the risk of regional and cross-border terrorism in East Africa threatens 
to limit severely, if not to undo, the region’s economic and democratic development. 
The stability of the Horn of Africa is of strategic interest to the United States and 
the international community. The spread of radical Islam, piracy, and other transnational 
crimes in the region are of strategic concern to the United States and the rest of the 
western world, hence the need for close cooperation and support to stabilize the region.11 
The 1998 twin attacks by al Qaeda on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 
2002 missile attack on an Israeli airline in Mombasa were signals of the extent of the 
threat of terrorism on western interests in the region. (The American embassy in Uganda 
had also been targeted, but the plan was foiled by intelligence). A stable East Africa 
would, for example, facilitate the western powers’ deployment of assets to collect 
information about radical extremists with bases in the region and also safeguard political 
and economic interests of the west in East Africa and the Horn of Africa.12  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Different scholars have advanced different definitions and interpretations of the 
concept of borders. Scorgie defined borders as “barriers of penetration, lines of 
                                                 
10 Kilonzo, “Terrorism in the Horn of Africa.”  
11 J. Peter Pham, “American Foreign Policy Interests,” The Journal of the National Committee on 
American Foreign Policy 27, no. 1 (August 2005): 19–25, http://www.tandfonline.com.libproxy.nps.edu/
doi/full/10.1080/108039290919775. 
12 David H. Shinn, “Fighting Terrorism in East Africa and The Horn,” Foreign Service Journal, 
September 2004, 42. http://addisvoice.com/Ethiopia%20under%20Meles/
Terrrorism%20in%20the%20Horn%20Shinn.pdf.   
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separation, and the legal limits of a state’s sovereignty.”13 Herbst argued that states are 
only viable if they have control over all their boundaries, and failure to broadcast 
infrastructural power has been one of the factors behind the endemic civil wars in 
Africa.14 This fragile infrastructure, particularly at the borders, also contributes to the 
terrorism threats today. 
A historical review of Africa’s borders reveals that while establishing national 
boundaries in Africa, the European colonialists arbitrarily used “latitudes, longitudes, 
geometric circles and straight lines to split several ethnic and cultural communities” to 
establish administrative territories of their convenience, which were not effectively 
controlled.15  Part of the problem surely begins with the fact that the legal lines of 
contemporary borders do not necessarily match up with cultural or social practice. In pre-
colonial Africa, borders were viewed as a link and zones of contact with the neighboring 
communities; their permeability was necessary to further this function.16 With 
decolonization, these inorganic frontiers became national borders, but they did not always 
firm up fully in practical terms. Cultural connections have continued to thrive through 
shared cross-border activities, facilitated by the existence of unofficial entry and exit 
routes along the frontiers—all of which make borders that much more porous.  
Today scholars argue that globalization, which is characterized by 
internationalization of production, liberalization of trade, and development of 
communication technology, has led to the erosion of borders.17 Peter Andreas observes 
that, contrary to conventional wisdom that in the new world of globalization borders have 
                                                 
13 Lindsay Scorgie, “Peripheral Pariah or Regional Rebel?” The Allied Democratic Forces and the 
Uganda/Congo Borderland 100, no. 412 (February 18, 2011): 81, doi: 10.1080/00358533.2011.542297.  
14 Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 94. 
15 Freedom C. Onuoha, “Porous Borders and Boko Haram’s Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria,” 
Al Jazeera Center for Studies, September 8, 2013, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/09/
201398104245877469.htm.  
16 Timothy Mechlinski, “Towards an Approach to Borders and Mobility in Africa,” Journal of 
Borderland Studies 25, no. 2 (November 21, 2011), 98, doi: 10.108/08865655.2010.969576. 
17 Peter Andreas, “Redrawing the Line Borders and Security in the Twenty First Century,” 
International Security, 28, no. 2 (Fall 2003):  82–84.  
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become irrelevant, instead the state intervention through border policing has increased 
due to the rising risks emanating from clandestine cross-border criminal activities.18  
It is the function of the state to restrict territorial access by deterring infiltration of 
hostile groups or individuals into the country.19  The border can be a physical barrier, but 
it also can serve as a trade and economic opportunity, a balance that states must maintain 
in their border regimens. At the same time, as the Ugandan case makes clear, the regional 
aspect of border management underscores the indispensability of cooperation and 
information sharing. This literature review takes up all three aspects of border 
management in their turn. 
 Physical Barriers 1.
“Just princes build walls to keep unwanted people out, while unjust 
princes build walls to keep their own people in.” 
 —Machiavelli20 
Brent Sterling observes that apart from maintaining security, walls as physical 
barriers give assurance to nationals that the state is doing something about the threat to 
security, “the image of a fortified border being considered more important than its actual 
effectiveness.”21 He also characterizes fortifications in three types: “refuge—temporary 
shelter from attack,” “positions for sustained active defense” and “strategic defense 
including barriers, lines, walls and fences.”22 A border fence or fortification most clearly 
falls into the third category, at least for proponents of such measures. Sterling further 
asserts that modern border walls are not just edifices of masonry architecture or wire 
mesh; rather they are complex physical barriers, flanked by boundary roads, topped by 
                                                 
18 Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the US-Mexico Divide (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2009), 4–6. 
19 Andreas, Border Games, 78. 
20 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses (New York: Random House, Inc., 1940), 81. 
21 Brent L. Sterling, Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbours? What History Teaches Us about 
Strategic Barriers and International Security (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 115. 
22 Ibid., 309. 
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barbed wire, fitted with sensors, surveillance cameras, and spotlights, and operated under 
a set of laws and regulations.23  
On the other hand, some scholars have observed that walls are commonly built 
along borders among states with disparities in wealth. In Africa, for example, Botswana, 
with a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of U.S. $16,400, has erected a 300-mile 
electric fence along its border with Zimbabwe, whose GDP is U.S. $600.24  The primary 
objective of the wall is to control the threat of the spread of the contagious foot and 
mouth disease from Zimbabwe to Botswana, which threatens the cattle and beef 
industry—the country’s second-largest revenue earner after diamonds.25 Also, between 
2000 and 2003, Botswana’s population of 1.8 million was under threat of an influx of 
illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe, who came seeking employment opportunities. About 
60,000 Zimbabwe nationals were reported to have entered the country through its porous 
borders; about 2,500 were repatriated each month. Leaders hoped that a fence would 
control the illegal movements across the border.26 
Taking advantage of a porous border, Palestinian nationals easily accessed Israel 
in search of employment and basic welfare needs; however, the influx of the Palestinians 
also provided easy access for terrorists to infiltrate Israel through the West Bank. This 
situation compelled the Israeli government, in 2002, to erect a “security fence,” 50 to 70 
meters wide, consisting two layers of “smart fence” and a buffer.27 While there was a 
dramatic fall in the number of successful terrorist incidents, the Israeli barrier had several 
problems. The fence separated Palestinian families, part of Palestinian land was annexed, 
and this situation has formed a source of conflict between the two states. The 
                                                 
23 Sterling, “Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbours?,” 112. 
24  Index Mundi, “Zimbabwe vs. Botswana,” accessed July 10, 2015 http://www.indexmundi.com/
factbook/compare/zimbabwe.botswana/economy.  
25 Rory Carroll, “Botswana Erects 300-Mile Electrified Fence to Keep Cattle (and Zimbabweans) 
Out,” The Guardian, September 9, 2003, accessed May 16, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/
sep/10/southafrica.zimbabwe. 
26 Ibid. 




International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled against Israel’s unilateral action, and the United 
Nations (UN), too, condemned it.28 So far, Israel has stuck by its fence as an effective 
counterterrorism measure. To detractors, however, it is a symbol of a security state gone 
too far. 
In 1999 in the United States, debate over the Mexico–U.S. border was not on 
whether border control should be escalated, but rather about how and how much to 
escalate it. Options included deployments of more border agents, better inspection and 
surveillance technologies, and more collaboration with Mexico.29 At the time, the idea of 
constructing a wall, fence, or any other physical barrier along the 1,954-mile continental 
border seemed far-fetched. After 9/11, however, the construction of border fortifications, 
which was a common feature during the colonial and Cold War eras as a measure for 
ensuring state sovereignty, resurfaced with a new cachet.30  Fortifying the political 
boundary with some kind of physical structure seemed to many the only prudent next step 
in post-9/11 border management. 
Reece Jones argues that though such external factors as countering terrorists, 
insurgents, or drug cartels contribute to states’ decisions to build border walls, such 
internal factors as safeguarding the state’s sovereignty, protecting its wealth, and 
preserving the nation’s culture are more compelling reasons for construction of border 
walls.31  
                                                 
28 The International Court of Justice (ICJ), “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory,” July 9, 2004, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
index.php?pr=71&code=mwp&p1=3&p2=4&p3=6. 
29 Andreas, Border Games, 146.  
30 Elisabeth Vallet and Charles-Philippe David, “Introduction: The (Re) Building of the Wall in 
International Relations,” Journal of Borderlands Studies 27, no. 2 (2012): 111–119, doi: 10.1080/
08865655.2012.687211. 
31 Reece Jones, “Why Build a Border Wall?” NACLA Report on the Americas 45, no. 3 (2012).   
.https://nacla.org/article/why-build-border-ll.  
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 Balancing Security and Economics 2.
This great and peaceful border must be open to business, must be open to 
people—and it’s got to be closed to terrorists and criminals. 
—President George Bush, 200232 
There is a general consensus among scholars and leaders on the need to balance 
enforcement of security measures at borders with economic interests. Peter Andreas 
argues that borders should not only act as obstacles against “Clandestine Transnational 
Actors (CTAs), but also as filters that do not impede legitimate border crossing.”33 He 
also observes that maintaining a balance between guaranteeing border security and at the 
same time facilitating international trade is one of the biggest technological and political 
challenges faced by modern states.34  Andreas also observes that while a comprehensive 
security enforcement strategy is implemented along the U.S borders, at the same time the 
country unloads about 6 million containers at its ports every year, and about 340,000 
vehicles and 58,000 ships enter the country daily. This figure is expected to double in the 
next ten years.35  
Andreas further explains that with an eye toward the trade-frontier aspect of the 
border, in 2000, the U.S. government signed a “Smart Borders” agreement with Canada. 
Under the agreement, the United States introduced modern equipment to check travellers 
crossing the border. The Unites States also employs the “Secure Trade Program” that 
minimizes congestion at entry points.36 In addition, the government operates a 
“Passenger Accelerated Service” to minimize long passenger queues.37  Additionally, 
joint inspection facilities are provided to customs and immigration officials to facilitate 
physical inspection away from the U.S. side of the border to avoid delays and congestion. 
                                                 
 32 Andreas, “Redrawing the Line Borders and Security,” 96. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid.,100. 
35 Ibid., 96. 
36 Ibid., 96–98. 
37 Kyle W. Killingbeck, “Caught in the Middle at the U.S.-Canadian Border” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2013), 9. 
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These programs have survived the significant shift in the U.S. view of its border, 
which eventuated after 9/11. They thus have mitigated likely friction with Canada, whose 
border priority is trade, not border security.38 It also assuages the significant number of 
Americans, including officials in the U.S. states that line the northern border, who are 
opposed to the excessive security arrangements at borders that are seen to interfere with 
commerce.39 The relative calm of more a decade in the United States since 9/11 has 
strengthened the argument against excessive border controls. Killingbeck further 
observes that rather than stifle trade, many Americans would even forego a certain level 
of security to ensure trade with Canada is not disrupted.40 
Africa’s share of global exports is only 3 percent. Many scholars argue that 
though some of the reasons for the low volume of Africa’s trade are externally based, 
others relate it to barriers prevailing within African countries—many of them security 
expedients. Olusegun Aganga, for example, claims that by 2014, in an attempt to ensure 
security of goods imported and exported from Lagos to Seme Port, Benin, border, 
Nigerian security agencies operated 35 check points during the day and 50 check points 
at night. Needless to say, this regime disrupts free movement of goods and services and 
also fails to draw a balance between security and commerce.41  
On the other hand, Ann Dumbuya explains that in Sierra Leon, the National 
Revenue Authority (NRA), the agency mandated to collect state revenue, has in the past 
few years modernized the processes and procedures of tax collection at its entry points. In 
June 2012, it introduced the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA); in 
addition, it signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with its neighbor, Guinea, 
which has enabled customs officials to jointly operate under one roof. As a result, time 
                                                 
38 Kyle W. Killingbeck,”Caught in the Middle at the U.S.-Canadian Border,” 9. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 79. 
41 Olusegun Aganga, “Trade Policies and Regional Integration in Africa,” This Day Live, February 12, 
2014, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/trade-policies-and-regional-integration-in-africa/171177/.    
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taken by traders and other travellers to cross the border has been significantly reduced, 
and also a balance between trade facilitation and border security is realized.42 
 Cooperation and Information Sharing  3.
The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the emergence of globalization has not only 
created “a borderless world,” but it also has facilitated the advancement of transnational 
crimes, including proliferation of weapons, money laundering, corruption and drug 
trafficking, all of which have reinforced the threat of terrorism.43  The complex nature of 
modern terrorism dictates that states and security agencies cooperate and share 
information.  
In terms of terrorism, information sharing relates to the exchange of antiterrorist 
intelligence. Jorg Friedrich defines it as “information given to executive agencies, namely 
police and the secret services, not only to identify and arrest terrorists but also to act 
tactically or strategically to prevent terrorist crime from happening.”44  International 
terrorism is a complex phenomenon. According to Rohan Gunaratna and Matthew Levitt,  
recruitment is done in one country, training in another, and the attack 
executed in a third country. In the case of the September 11 attacks, for 
example, al-Qaeda recruited members from Germany, trained them in 
Afghanistan, and attacked the United States.45  
The line between domestic and foreign threats is obscure, and transnational 
threats are now more interconnected, hence the need for cooperation in a multinational 
                                                 
42 Ann Marie Dumbuya, “Sierra Leone: Trade Facilitation and Border Security - Striking the Right 
Balance,” AllAfrica, February 12, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201505080510.html. 
43 Hans Born, Ian Leigh, and Aidan Wills, International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability 
(New York: Routledge, 2012), 20. 
44 Jorg Friedrich, Fighting Terrorism and Drugs: Europe and International Cooperation (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 75. 
45Rohan Gunaratna and Matthew Levitt, The Matrix of International Terrorism: The Global Jihadist 
Threat (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute, 2003), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/the-matrix-of-international-terrorism-the-global-jihadist-threat.  
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context—failure to share information among national and international agencies has been 
presented as a major reason for the success of the 9/11 terrorist attack.46   
In their study, Denis Caleta and Paul Shamella observed that through such 
cooperation, intelligence gaps are filled, costs of intelligence collection are minimized, 
and diplomatic relations are established among states.47 Information sharing and 
cooperation could be between domestic and international partners and may include: 
sharing of collected intelligence, analyses, estimates, joint operations and interrogation of 
terrorism suspects.48 Strengthening information-sharing mechanisms is seen as the most 
effective option of countering global terrorism.49  
Hoffman and Morrison-Taw observe that the lack of cooperation and coordination 
among authorities in the 1970s and 1980s allowed terrorists in Western Europe to move 
undetected into France, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. The authors assert that for 
counterterrorism to succeed, security services and affected states must cooperate. Such 
collaboration prevents the terrorists from establishing sanctuaries across borders and also 
curtails the movement of terrorists and their agents.50 States must cooperate and 
coordinate; it is difficult even for the most advanced countries to effectively manage their 
borders. For example, using routes from South America and connections from Russia and 
Eastern Europe, about 100,000 Chinese immigrants land at Mexican or North American 
ports by ship and illegally enter the United States annually.51  
A number of obstacles that limit information sharing and cooperation among 
intelligence agencies have been identified. At the international level, discrepancies in the 
                                                 
46 Branko Lobkinar,  Intelligence and Combating Terrorism: New Paradigm and Future Challenges, 
edited by Denis Caleta, and  Paul Shamella, Ljubljana, Slovenia: Institute for Corporate Security Studies, 
2014, 77. 
47 Branko Lobkinar,  Intelligence and Combatting Terrorism, 2014, 78. 
48 Ibid., 79. 
49 Born, Leigh, and Wills, International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability. 20. 
50 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw, A Strategic Frame Work for Countering Terrorism (N-
3506-DOS) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2005/
N3506.pdf.  
51 Peter, Lupsha, “Transnational Organized Crime versus the Nation-State,” Transnational Organized 
Crime 2, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 26. 
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definition of who is and who is not a terrorist affect the extent of information sharing and 
cooperation. In some cases, states even cooperate with terrorist groups, as long as they 
further their interests. For instance, in the recent past, though part of the global effort to 
fight terrorism, Pakistan supported Al Qaeda-allied terrorist groups against its rival, 
India.52 Jorg Friendrichs observed that the sensitivities about national sovereignty and the 
fear by states that intelligence data could be compromised or even destroyed in the course 
of international exchange limit cooperation and information sharing. These discrepancies 
among agencies make information sharing complicated.53 
At the national level, competing interests and rivalry among agencies hinder 
information sharing, while at the regional level, fragile and dynamic political situations, 
particularly in developing countries, disrupt cooperation. Worse, intelligence agencies 
often are viewed as being inherently bureaucratic, highly secretive, and 
compartmentalized; this assumption further limits the extent to which information may be 
shared.54 What’s more, different levels of capability and capabilities among agencies 
limit the extent of information sharing and cooperation. On the whole, information 
exchange is limited by a combination of a number of factors that may include 
institutional cultures, varying capabilities, rivalry, confidentiality, state policy, political 
influence, and mistrust.55 
From the literature review, it is apparent that the security of borders is a priority 
concern of all states. In regard to the U.S–Canada frontier, though, a compromise on 
balancing economic and security interests has been largely realized; this remains so, as 
long as the United States’ security is not threatened. On the other hand, Israel has ignored 
the position of the international community, including the UN, and continued to 
strengthen its controversial “Smart Wall” with Palestine. Similar sentiments expressed by 
Zimbabwe have been ignored by Botswana in defense of its national interests. These 
                                                 
52 Caleta and Shemella, Intelligence and Combatting Terrorism, 2014, 82. 
53 Jorg Friedrichs, Fighting Terrorism and Drugs:Europe and International Police Cooperation, 
Routledge, 2007, 60. 
54 Caleta and Shamella, Intelligence and Combatting Terrorism, 2014, 81–85. 
55 Ibid., 79–87. 
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dynamics and such others as the impediments to cooperation and information sharing 
among countries across borders are of interest to this study.    
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATION AND HYPOTHESES  
Arising from the split of border communities by the colonial boundaries, 
nationalities across borders cooperate to out-maneuver the state to ensure their survival.56 
The dilemma of Uganda’s porous borders is, to a great extent, exacerbated by the state’s 
inability to exert full authority over the “border-landers” who look at the state’s 
enforcement machinery as a threat to their existence.  
On the other hand, the informal trade activities conducted by the border 
communities have a significant contribution to national development. For example, in 
2012, Uganda’s informal imports contributed 16.1 percent of the total imports, while 
informal exports contributed 4.2 percent of all exports. Most of the informal imports 
(46.3 percent) were from Kenya.57  However, the illegal routes through which these 
transactions are made also serve other transnational criminals including terrorist agents. 
A similar scenario prevails on Uganda’s western and northwestern borders with the DRC 
where criminals have operated across borders, exploiting links between cross-border 
communities. 
 Lack of strong, established and well-facilitated structures along Uganda’s borders 
to effectively conduct surveillance and monitor border activities provides transnational 
criminals with an opportunity to violate the national borders. However, this situation can 
only be remedied by a regional effort between Uganda and its neighbors through joint 
border operations and information sharing. Though some improvements in this regard are 
underway, the development is ad hoc and needs improvement. 
                                                 
56David Coplan, “Introduction: From Empiricism to Theory in African Border Studies,” Journal of 
Borderlands Studies 25, no. 2 (November 2011): 1–5, doi:10.1080/08865655.2010.9695757.  
57 Bank of Uganda, The Informal Cross Border Trade Survey Report 2012 (Kampala, Uganda: 




E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Given the complexity and unique nature of international borders, each influenced 
by different historical, cultural, economic, social, and political factors, this research seeks 
to gain insight into the problem and, at the end, suggest some recommendations. The 
research therefore employs an exploratory approach to understanding the dilemma of 
porous borders in combatting terrorism in Uganda. Specifically, it explores how 
Uganda’s law enforcement agencies secure the country without undermining legitimate 
economic and social activities conducted through the borders.  
Through exploratory research, the study explores the regional cooperation and 
coordination mechanism in place between Uganda and her regional partners on one hand 
and between Uganda and the international community on the other hand. The research 
also explores the various strategies in place to combat terrorism in Uganda and the region 
in general. Because the threat of terrorism and porous borders is a regional challenge, 
priority of the literature to be explored relates to Uganda’s ring states (Burundi, DRC, 
Central African Republic, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Southern Sudan, and Tanzania). The 
research uses available primary sources, particularly government documents; and official 
reports by reputable international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, 
African Union (AU), East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD), and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
(ICGLR), on policy matters relating to the borders in East Africa. It also considers 
selected material from the media. Furthermore, the research uses scholarly secondary 
material including books, journals, articles, and seminar papers. Also, documents by 
strategic partners who have been working closely with Uganda in combatting terrorism—
for example, the U.S. State Department—round out the source material.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
The thesis comprises five chapters. Chapter I covers the background of terrorism 
in Uganda, the literature review, and the methodology. Chapter II looks at Uganda’s 
border situation to establish the nature and extent of the terrorism threat in Uganda and 
how the porous borders impact the efforts to combat terrorism. Chapter III examines 
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Uganda’s counterterrorism strategy and evaluates its impact. Chapter IV assesses the 
regional counterterrorism efforts in East Africa and examines the extent of cooperation 
and information sharing. Chapter V includes an analysis from the findings in the 
preceding chapters, draws a conclusion, and suggests recommendations. 
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II. UGANDA’S BORDER SITUATION
Before independence, African national borders were vaguely defined and 
physically un-demarcated by the European colonizers. The frontiers were entirely a 
matter of administrative convenience for the imperialist powers; they had little, if 
anything, to do with the native geographic or cultural boundaries of the place. For 
example, Mark Leopold describes a response by a colonial agent when asked to clarify 
the Uganda-Congo border: 
The West Nile section of the border had been defined by treaty between 
Britain and Belgium as the watershed of the Nile and Congo rivers, and it 
therefore ran for much of its length along the top of a range of hills. He 
asked his superior how he was to know which side was which, and was 
told that, where the streams ran west (towards the River Congo) this was 
the Congo side, and where they ran east (towards the Nile) that was 
Uganda. ‘‘What about where there are no streams?’’ he asked, and was 
told ‘‘Then just piss on the ground and see which way it flows’’58  
Like most other African states, after independence, Uganda’s international 
borders became a source of conflict and a conduit for crimes. Peter Andreas remarks that 
“borders are under siege by clandestine transnational activities.”59  Uganda’s borders, 
too, witness a host of hostile activities including human trafficking, smuggling, arms 
trafficking, and transnational terrorism. This chapter describes Uganda’s geography and 
how it facilitates terrorism; it assesses the situation at Uganda’s borders and also explores 
factors that make Uganda’s borders porous.  
A. UGANDA’S GEOGRAPHY 
Uganda is located in the East African region. It lies along the equator and covers 
about 91,136 miles—almost the size of the U.S. state of Oregon.60  Uganda’s borderline 
is about 1,676 miles. Its northern border with South Sudan covers a stretch of 270 miles; 
58 Mark Leopold, “Crossing the Line: 100 Years of the North-West Uganda/South Sudan border,” 
Journal of Eastern African Studies 3, no. 3 (2009), 470, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531050903273743 
59 Andreas, Border Games, 142 
60  “Uganda,” Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations, 2007, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/
Uganda.aspx. 
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the eastern borderline with Kenya, 580 miles; southern border with Tanzania, 246 miles; 
the southwestern border with Rwanda, 105 miles; and the western Democratic Republic 
of Congo, 475 miles.61 Figure 1 depicts a map of Uganda and its neighboring states. 
Figure 1. Uganda and its Neighbors—Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania 
Source: Emma Blackman, “The Story of the Kiwi Sponsorships,” I Left my Love in 
Uganda, March 11, 2015, http://ileftmyheartinuganda.com/.   
The geopolitical location of Uganda as a land-locked country and its proximity in 
the Great Lakes region exposes it to adverse effects of instability in the affected states.62 
For example, as a result of conflicts in the DRC, South Sudan, and Somalia, Uganda 
hosts more than 500,000 refugees. The influx of refugees comes with economic, social, 
61  Nations Encyclopedia, Small Business Solutions, Uganda. http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/
geography/Slovenia-to-Zimbabwe-Cumulative-Index/Uganda.html. 
62 World Statistics, “Pocketbook, Country Profile,” United Nations Statistics Division. Accessed 
October 20, 2015.  http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Uganda. 
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and political consequences, including infiltration by terrorists.63  In addition, South 
Sudan  offers the largest market for Uganda’s exports, yet within five months of the 
outbreak of civil  war, Uganda’s export revenue from South Sudan dropped by about 80 
percent  (from $73,509,753 to $14,701,950).64 Compared to its neighbors, Uganda has a 
small strategic depth of only 35.9 square miles of territory per mile of border. The limited 
strategic depth compels Uganda to take “pro-pro-active strategies to promote regional 
cohesion, manage the borders better, and deter potential adversaries.”65   
B. THE SITUATION AT UGANDA’S BORDERS 
Cross-border trade is the main activity along Uganda’s borders. Though the trade 
is of high economic significance to Uganda and its neighbors, it also poses a challenge to 
national security. This trade is conducted through foot paths or “panya routes”—”panya” 
is the Swahili word for “rat.”  Wafula Okum explains that “illegal border crossing points, 
usually called ‘mice or rat routes,’ are used by smugglers who charge a fee ranging from 
$15.”66  Transporters commonly known as “boda boda” facilitate the movement of 
uncustomed goods across borders because of their familiarity with security officials and 
other border officials.67 Due to the complexity of informal activities along the border, 
monitoring by security is not effective enough to counter likely infiltration of 
transnational criminals, particularly terrorists along Uganda’s borders. 
                                                 
63 UNHCR, “2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile–Uganda,” The UN Refugee Agency, accessed 
May 4, 2015. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483c06.html. 
64 Patrick Kagenda, “The Lost Merchants of Juba,” The Independent, May 31, 2014, 
http://www.independent.co.ug/features/features/9018-the-lost-merchants-of-juba-. 
65Ministry of Defence of Uganda, White Paper on Defence Transformation (London: Conflict, 
Security, and Development Group, June 17, 2004), http://www.securityanddevelopment.org/pdf/gou.pdf.  
66 Wafula Okumu, Border Management and Security in Africa (Concordis Briefing 4) (Cambridge, 
England: Concordis International, June 2011), http://concordis.international/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/
2011_Sudan_Border_Regime_Briefing_4_BORDER-MANAGEMENT-SECURITY-II_LR.pdf. 
67 In Uganda, the term “boda boda” is used to mean bicycle or motorcycle taxi. It is derived from the 
phrase “border to border movement.” The term originates from the early 1980s, when bicycles were used to 
carry travellers to Uganda/Kenya border points of Malaba and Busia because there were no vehicles. Since 
then, transport by cyclists became popular and spread all over the country. Laura Sellmansberger, “Boda-




 South Sudan—Uganda’s Northern Border  1.
Uganda borders South Sudan in the north, with no significant natural barriers 
between the states. The outbreak of the civil war in South Sudan in December 2013 
almost led to the collapse of the state, a fate that was interrupted thanks in no small part 
to the prompt intervention of Ugandan forces. As a result of the civil war, Uganda’s 
northern border was overwhelmed by an influx of refugees; some of these were armed 
deserters who posed a security threat to the country.68  Despite the peace agreement 
signed between the South Sudan government and the opposition rebel leader, war rages 
on in some parts of the country.69 Although there is no evidence of terrorist cells in South 
Sudan, there is suspicion that terrorists from the Horn of Africa could exploit the 
country’s porous borders to transit to Uganda and the rest of the region.70 
The LRA continues to exploit the confusion in South Sudan and the region to 
maneuver and survive in the vast and difficult terrain, hence remaining a potential threat 
to Uganda’s northern border. For example, the LRA fighters poach elephants for ivory in 
the DRC’s Garamba National Park. A source revealed that the LRA sold ivory to Sudan 
Armed Forces at Kafia King in Sudan and to unidentified individuals flying white 
helicopters, who in turn supplied guns, ammunition, and food to LRA fighters.71 Unless 
regional pressure against the LRA is sustained, poaching of elephants halted, and those 
involved in the ivory trade apprehended, the threat of the LRA to Uganda’s northern 
border remains real. 
                                                 
68 More than 60 military uniforms and ammunitions were recovered by Ugandan security personnel 
from the refugee camps in Amuru District. Refugee Law Project, Sudan Crisis: Impact on Northern 
Uganda: A Rapid Assessment Report, January, 2014 (Kampala, Uganda: Refugee Law Project, 2014), 
http://www.refugeelawproject.org/files/ACCS_activity_briefs/
14_01_24_Rapid_Assessment_Brief_Impact_of_South_Sudan_Crisis_in_Uganda.pdf.  
69 Marc Santora, “Salva Kiir, South Sudan’s President, Signs Peace Deal with Rebels,” The New York 
Times, August 26, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/27/world/africa/south-sudan-peace-deal-rebels-
president.html?_r=0. 
70“South Sudan 2015 Crime and Safety Report,” Bureau of Diplomatic Security, January 12, 2015, 
https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=16898. 
71 Kasper Agger and Jonathan Hutson, “Kony’s Ivory: How Elephant Poaching in Congo Helps 
Support the Lord’s Resistance Army” (Washington, DC: Enough Project, June 2013), 
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/KonysIvory.pdf. 
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 The DRC—Uganda’s Western Border 2.
In 1996, supported by the then-Congo government, the ADF terrorists established 
bases from which to terrorize the neighboring western Uganda districts of Kasese, 
Kabarole, and Bundibugyo, killing more than 1,000 civilians. In Kasese, a border district, 
by 2001, revenue collection had fallen by 75 percent as a result of the disruption and loss 
caused by the ADF.72   In the DRC, the ADF engaged in a series of atrocities, including 
“kidnapping and enslaving women and children, human trafficking, forced conversion, 
forced marriage, torture, summary execution, attacking hospitals, and using child 
soldiers.”73 Following these atrocities by the ADF, in 1998, the Uganda government 
deployed its forces to pursue them in their hideouts in the eastern DRC. At the same time, 
Rwanda also deployed forces in eastern DRC to pursue armed rebels who perpetrated the 
genocide four years prior and fled to the eastern DRC and now were threatening security 
across its border. In July 1999, the regional leaders signed the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement, demanding the two countries to withdraw their forces from the DRC. Chapter 
4 of the agreement, specifically, provided for the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces 
from the DRC; Chapter 12 required that the DRC government ensure the elimination of 
threats posed by armed groups along the DRC’s borders with its neighbors.74  
Despite the Lusaka Agreement, the situation along the border did not improve. 
Because the DRC government lacked the capacity to effectively control its eastern region 
and the UN Mission in Congo was not mandated to dislodge armed groups in the rebel-
affected Congo, the ADF maintained their camps, and therefore continued to threaten the 
Uganda border. 
Oblivious to the threat posed by the armed groups along the borders, the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1304 (2000), charging that Rwanda 
                                                 
72 Kristof Titeca and Koen Vlassenroot, “A Biography of the Allied Democratic Forces,” Journal of 
Eastern African Studies 6, no. 1 (February 2012): 159. 
73 Daniel Fahey, “New insights on Congo’s Islamist rebels,” The Washington Post, February 19, 2015, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/19/new-insights-on-congos-islamist-
rebels/.  
74 Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement,” U.S. Department of State, July 
10, 1999, http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/csbm/rd/22634.htm. 
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and Uganda “violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of DRC.”75 The UN 
demanded the immediate withdrawal of their troops under pain of punitive measures.76 
However, again the actual withdrawal of these foreign forces was not possible because of 
the continued presence of the ADF near the common borders with the DRC, who 
persistently crossed over and terrorized local communities. In September 2002, Uganda 
and DRC leaders signed an agreement for the orderly withdrawal of troops, while the 
DRC pledged to take measures to deny sanctuary to the rebels.77 By this time, the ADF’s 
capacity to launch attacks in Uganda had been significantly degraded by Uganda forces. 
In March 2007, the ADF attempted a major comeback to Uganda through the 
Bundibugyo district but were repulsed by the Uganda forces, with massive losses. While 
the Uganda military has pacified the Ugandan side of the border, the DRC side remains 
volatile. A UNSC report reveals that by 2013 the ADF occupied about 162 square miles 
of the eastern DRC’s–Beni province, along the Ugandan border.78 However, in 2014, the 
DRC and UN forces launched operations against the ADF; the rebels have been uprooted 
from their bases and are now scattered in the DRC’s jungle-mountainous terrain.  
The current challenge to Uganda’s security at the western border is its porousness 
due to cross-border social relations. Scorgie observes that the familial ties among the 
Congo (Banande) and Uganda (Bakonzo) borderland communities over the years create 
“an independent borderland identity” that complicates border control and generates 
friction in the border region.79  Because the border is open and border communities are 
                                                 
75 Security Council, “Security Council Demands that Ugandan and Rwandan Forces Withdraw 
Immediately from Kisangani, Democratic Republic Of Congo” (S/C/110/816), United Nations, June 2000, 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2000/20000616.sc6877.doc.html. 
76 Ibid.  
77  Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “Agreement Between the Governments of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Uganda on Withdrawal of Ugandan Troops from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cooperation and Normalization of Relations between the Two 
Countries (Luanda Agreement,” U.S. Department of State, September 6,  2002, 
http://www.beyondjuba.org/BJP1/policy_documents/
Ug_gov_and_DRCongo_gov_security_agreement.pdf. 
78 Emilie Serralta et al., Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(S/2014/42) (New York: United Nations Security Council, January 23, 2014), 20, 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/
s_2014_42.pdf.  
79 Scorgie, “Peripheral Pariah or Regional Rebel?,” 83. 
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bound by cultural and economic ties, individuals and groups move freely across the 
borders. These movements make it difficult to identify likely terrorists who could 
infiltrate the country through the border. The geostrategic position of the ADF in a 
remote mountainous terrain along the Uganda-DRC border has facilitated the survival of 
the rebels.80 The accessibility to Congo’s abundant gold and timber, and the ability to 
penetrate the vibrant cross-border trade using local agents provide the ADF with 
resources to conduct terror. For example, in the ADF’s area of control, timber dealers 
paid $300 per chainsaw to the ADF to harvest timber, while defaulters paid $500.81  
Accessibility to resources by the ADF, coupled with the DRC’s inability to deny them 
sanctuary across the border, perpetuates the survival of the terrorist group.  
 Kenya—Uganda’s Eastern Border 3.
The Kenya–Uganda border is the most vibrant of Uganda’s borders; it is the 
gateway for Uganda’s imports and exports through the Kenyan coastal port of Mombasa. 
Like other borders in Uganda, this border conducts a significant amount of trade. Though 
the bulk of trade is formal, a significant amount of it is informal (not documented by 
customs). Also along the border, illegal trade by petty smugglers takes place. Informal 
trade plays a significant role in Uganda’s economic development. In 2012, for example, 
informal imports contributed 16.1 percent of the total imports, while informal exports 
contributed 4.2 percent of all exports. Most informal imports were from Kenya, 
contributing 46.3 percent of the formal imports.82 In 2013, Kenya received 49.4 percent 
of Uganda’s informal exports. The Busia border point handled the greatest amount of 
Uganda’s informal exports to Kenya, accounting for 33.9 percent (US $18.2 million).83   
                                                 
80 International Crisis Group, Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU’s Lost Rebellion (Crisis Group Africa 
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Lack of capital, high taxes, and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures discourage 
low income traders to engage in formal transactions. Instead, based on speculation, they 
smuggle a variety of items in small quantities across the border.84  Goods are delivered at 
the border in concealment, temporarily stored, and later smuggled across the border, 
using head porterage or bicycles, through illegal entry points. Among the items smuggled 
are agricultural products and manufactured items.85  The porosity of the border and the 
cross-border familial ties among such communities as Samia, Gisu, and Iteso facilitates 
these cross-border transactions, but at the same time jeopardizes security at the border.   
 Kenya—Uganda’s Northeastern Border 4.
Though Uganda’s northeastern border is part of the 580-mile eastern border with 
Kenya, it is unique in terms of activities and the terrorist threat in Uganda. Karamoja, a 
region in the northeast of Uganda, is home to five major Karamojong nomadic pastoral 
tribes, including the Dodoth, Jie, Bokora, Matheniko, Tepth, and Pian. All live in a semi-
arid savannah bushland area. The region borders the nomadic Turkana and Pokot 
communities of Kenya and the Toposa nomadic tribe of South Sudan.86  Before 1926, 
when the British colonialists arbitrarily established the Kenya–Uganda border, the 
Turkana and Pokot pastoralists of West Kenya lived and shared resources with the 
Karamojong pastoralists in the then Rudolf Province of Uganda.87 The Karamojong share 
cultural and linguistic ties with the communities across the border.88  Whereas informal 
trade and smuggling are the main activities along most of the Kenya-Uganda border, in 
contrast, armed cross-border raiding of livestock has been the main activity along the 
Uganda–Kenya northeastern border.  
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Cattle rustling, in turn, has cultivated the illegal arms trade in the territory—
among other dubious enterprises that today have terroristic potential. The Karamojong 
and other nomadic communities for decades provided markets for illicit weapons from 
the region. The first modern rifles in Karamoja were brought by Arab and Swahili 
merchants in the mid-19th century, when ivory was exchanged for guns with the 
Karamojongs. Also, the Shifta, a banditry group from Ethiopia and Somalia, supplied 
guns in exchange for ivory with the pastoralist tribes of Karamoja region.89  Though no 
significant incidents related to terrorism have been registered on the northeastern border, 
the region remains vulnerable to an influx of illegal arms, which could fall in terrorist 
hands. Some of the weapons are suspected to originate from terrorist-infested Somalia 
and infiltrate into the Karamoja region through the porous Uganda–Kenya border. The 
continued inflow of arms and persistent cattle rustling led to stagnation of development in 
the northeastern region.90 
To contain the problem of cattle rustling and to halt the infiltration of arms, in 
2001, the Uganda government launched a phased disarmament exercise. The first phase 
was to mobilize, sensitize, and encourage the voluntary hand-over of illegal guns in 
Karamoja.91 The second phase called for military pressure on violent armed warriors to 
apprehend and prosecute whoever failed to voluntarily hand over the illegal arms. The 
second phase is also referred to as the forceful disarmament phase, focused on recovering 
an estimated 40,000 illegal guns in Karamoja.92  By 2012, the disarmament process had 
registered remarkable success, with cattle rustling halted and most of the illegal guns 
recovered; peace has been restored in Karamoja region.93  So far, Uganda has been 
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fortunate that apart from cattle rustling along the porous northeastern border, no terrorist-
related activity has been registered. However, the challenge of illegal arms across the 
borders persists because neighboring Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan have not 
disarmed their warriors.94  The permanent deployment of Ugandan security forces along 
the border to keep guard against suspicious cross-border movements may control cattle 
rustlers, but does not guarantee safety against infiltration by terrorists. 
C. OTHER FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO UGANDA’S POROUS 
BORDERS  
Apart from the geopolitical factors that make Uganda’s borders porous, there are 
also institutional factors that compound the problem of porous borders. Among these are 
lack of modern equipment, inadequate manpower, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, 
unresolved border disputes, and poor cooperation with local communities. 
 Lack of Modern Equipment  1.
While terrorism exhibits a high level of resilience and significant ability to adapt 
to new technology, at Uganda’s entry ports, security monitoring is insufficient, partly 
because of a lack of modern technical equipment necessary for detection of materials 
crossing into the country.95 Nelson Alusala, for example, observes that inspection of 
trucks by security at Uganda’s border points is ineffective; verification is manually done 
because of the lack of such modern equipment as scanners.96 At Uganda’s Entebbe 
International Airport, the body and baggage scanners are unable to detect a variety of 
explosives. Among other things, the airport needs to upgrade its modern X-ray machines, 
night-vision equipment, and the intelligent camera system. Bureaucratic procedures and 
budgetary constraints have delayed the procurement of these items.97 Lack of modern 
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equipment makes Uganda’s borders more porous and vulnerable to infiltration by 
terrorists. 
 Inadequate Manpower 2.
According to Uganda’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, while Uganda has 40 
gazetted immigration border points, there are more than 300 illegal border points 
operating along its borders.98  Even the gazetted immigration points are ill-manned 
because the immigration department does not have adequate manpower. Further, security 
deployments are concentrated at the entry ports, and few are available to patrol the 
borderline.99 Inadequate manpower leaves security vacuums, which exacerbate the 
problem of porous borders. 
 Corruption 3.
Among the manifestations of corruption is bribery. Alex Tumushabe observes that 
laxity in immigration control, poor remuneration, and corruption among security officials 
at border stations complicates the challenge of porous borders in Uganda.100  Similarly, a 
2013 report by a Uganda Parliament oversight committee on borders also reveals that 
corruption by revenue collectors at some of the customs border posts is prevalent.101   
Kambere rightly argues that a porous border does not only mean physical absence 
of border controls, but also the potential of border posts being manipulated by terrorist 
agents to smuggle into the country bombs and bomb materials.102 It is possible that 
terrorist agents enter and exit the country’s border points with ease because of the 
possibility to bribe officials. 
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 Inadequate Infrastructure 4.
Lack of basic infrastructure undermines efficiency in the control of borders in 
Uganda. The Parliamentary committee report also reveals that many entry ports in 
Uganda lack sufficient office space and accommodation for border officials.103 Such 
inadequacies undermine motivation to work, create inefficiency, and could lead to 
unethical behavior among personnel. In addition, though Uganda’s road infrastructure has 
greatly improved, there are some remote border stations, like Suam on the Uganda-Kenya 
border, that are almost inaccessible during wet seasons.104 Communication infrastructure, 
on the other hand, has improved thanks to the numerous mobile telephone networks in 
the country.  
Because of Uganda’s delay in institutionalizing the use of national identity cards 
and also because of failure to effectively guard borders, immigrants enter freely by water 
and land and settle in the country undetected.105 The planners of the July 11 terrorist 
attack acquired residence in Kampala with ease. In the last two years, Uganda has 
embarked on the exercise of registration of eligible citizens for national identity cards.106 
With the completion of the exercise last December, it is hoped that infiltration into the 
country by criminal elements, particularly terrorists, will be minimized. 
 Unresolved Border Disputes 5.
 Uganda, like many colonial states of Africa, is at conflict with some of its 
neighbors over unresolved border disputes. For example, since 2004, Uganda has had a 
dispute with Kenya over Migingo Island in Lake Victoria, on the eastern border. Both 
countries claim ownership of the one-acre island that is strategically used by their 
fishermen. The tensions raised serious border tensions and could have led to a clash 
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between the two friendly states, but political intervention saved the situation.107  There 
are similar conflicts along South Sudan and the eastern DRC borderlines.   
In the disputed areas, there is no clear and deliberate security plan; any attempt to 
institute security controls such as border patrols would threaten the territorial sovereignty 
of the neighboring state. Wafula Okum in his study of Africa’s borders argues that, “one 
cannot control what one does not patrol.”108 These disputes increase the vulnerability to 
infiltration by terrorists into the country. 
 Resistance by Local Communities 6.
Border communities regard interference in their longstanding economic and 
cultural cross-border relations by government officials as intrusion. This attitude has led 
to clashes with border enforcement officials and undermines cooperation of stake holders 
at borders.109  Kriestof Titeca and Tom de Herdt cite an incident in 2009 in which 
Uganda enforcement officials operating along the northwest border with the DRC 
impounded some jerry cans of smuggled fuel from a group of smugglers. In retaliation, a 
gang of illegal fuel dealers—calling themselves the OPEC Boys—and other traders 
raided the offices of the Uganda Revenue Authority and set it ablaze.110 Such tensions 
between border communities and border officials have characterized Uganda’s borders. 
However, this hostility is being handled through increased training and improved 
supervision of enforcement personnel, on the one hand, and sensitization of the 
communities, on the other. 
D. CONCLUSION 
A combination of geopolitical factors including Uganda’s central location in a 
conflict infested region, a terrain that is difficult to dominate, and the long historical 
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cross-border relations among communities that facilitate informal activities, on one hand, 
and institutional factors including lack of modern equipment, insufficient manpower, 
corruption, unresolved border disputes, poor infrastructure, and limited cooperation 
between border officials and local communities,  on the other hand, make the borders in 
Uganda porous. The security of any nation begins with secure borders. Arguably, a 
successful counterterrorism strategy in Uganda must inevitably consider the combination 




III. UGANDA’S COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES 
Whitaker asserts that countries that experience international or domestic terrorism 
are more likely to comply with the UN international counterterrorism regime than those 
that are less threatened. This observation holds true in Uganda.111 UNSC Resolution 
1317 (2001) requires member states to uphold international conventions on terrorism and 
put in place relevant domestic legislation to implement the agreements.112 By 2002, 
Uganda had ratified all of the international conventions on terrorism and enacted the 
Anti-Terrorism Act.113 Whitaker further observes that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 
more powerful states, particularly the hegemonic United States, pressured weaker states 
to adopt the international counterterrorism regime, pass domestic laws, share intelligence, 
and track individuals and groups involved in terrorism.114   
Uganda complied with the international conventions on terrorism mainly because 
of its own terrorism threat posed by the LRA and the ADF, which had transnational 
links.115 The requirements of the international counterterrorism regime converged with 
Uganda’s interest to establish partnerships in the fight against terrorism.116 By adopting 
the regime, Uganda has not only been able to access external support to fight its own 
homegrown terrorism, but also to play a leading role in the regional counterterrorism 
efforts. 
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Like other countries in the region, Uganda has not yet established a formal 
national counterterrorism strategy.117 However, it has modelled its counterterrorism 
policies on the regional counterterrorism framework and international counterterrorism 
strategies. Uganda’s counterterrorism measures comprise a combination of law 
enforcement (police, immigration, and customs), intelligence, military, and diplomatic 
approaches. This chapter examines the four approaches and assesses their respective 
impact on combating terrorism in the country. 
A. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT APPROACH  
The law enforcement approach primarily uses the law and criminal justice system 
as a counterterrorism measure. The legislature has enacted several counterterrorism laws. 
The police, supported by the intelligence services, employ the law to identify, apprehend, 
and facilitate the prosecution of terror suspects.  
 Legislative Measures 1.
Since 2000, Uganda has adopted several legislative measures to counter terrorism. 
The following laws have been passed to combat terrorism in Uganda. 
a. The Anti-terrorism Act, 2002 
Although Uganda had experienced acts of terrorism since the early 1990s, most 
notably by the ADF and the LRA, terrorism-related crimes were prosecuted as capital 
offences under Uganda’s Penal Code Act.118 The 9/11 terrorist attack and UNSC 
Resolution 1317 (2001) offered Uganda an opportunity to review its own situation and 
redefine LRA and ADF atrocities as terrorism. Consistent with the UNSC resolution, 
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Uganda enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2002.119 The act criminalizes a series of 
terrorism-related activities focusing on individuals involved in planning, instigating, 
supporting, funding, or conducting acts of terrorism. The act authorizes investigations of 
such acts, including interception of correspondences and surveillance of terror 
suspects.120  
While the Act has proved to be one of the most effective counterterrorism 
measures in Uganda, it has also attracted criticism among scholars, human rights 
activists, and opposition politicians who view it as a tool to stifle opposition in the 
country.121 Alex Tumushabe observes that Uganda’s Anti-Terrorism Act does not 
definitively distinguish between plain criminal acts and acts of terrorism. As a result, 
there is a risk that authorities might include cases under the terrorism label that were not 
envisaged by the proponents of the law, bringing more and more serious charges against 
defendants who otherwise would be processed as criminals.122  
Similarly, Maxwell Wright in his study argues that Uganda leadership exploited 
the counterterrorism rhetoric after 9/11 to suppress political dissent. He claims that the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 was aimed at suppressing domestic political opposition, while 
at the international level, to win legitimacy for such measures, the Uganda leadership 
“situated” the country as a victim of terrorism. Citing a speech by a Uganda delegation at 
the UN, Maxwell states 
Ugandan delegates presented the United Nations Counter-terrorism 
Committee with an initial report detailing the steps they had taken 
domestically in order to adhere to the requirements of Resolution 1373. In 
the report, Uganda again situated itself as a long-time victim of terrorism, 
citing attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Allied Democratic 
Forces as early as 1988 and 1994…Ugandan delegates to the UN 
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continued to reiterate this narrative throughout the 2000s, often referring 
to both the LRA and ADF as enduring and notorious terrorist groups.123 
Contrary to Maxwell’s claims, Fredrick Ochieng observes that using the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 2002, Uganda has been able to implement preventive and disruptive 
counterterrorist measures. As a result, attempts by terrorists to attack Uganda have not 
succeeded beyond the 2010 Kampala terrorist attacks.124 Because there is no perfect law, 
there will always be dissenting views and the need for its amendment. The Anti-
Terrorism Act 2002 is no exception, and the debate about the reach and scope of the act 
forms part of this refinement process. In the second schedule of the act, Uganda lists the 
ADF, LRA, and Al-Qaeda as terrorist organizations.  
The difficulty is identifying who is and who is not a terrorist under the law. 
Though the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 does not explicitly define who a terrorist is, still, it 
clarifies that an individual whose objective is to influence government or intimidate the 
masses for a political, religious, social or economic motive indiscriminately and in 
disregard of others’ safety or property, commits an act of terrorism.125 Because of gaps 
within the law, the government has proposed amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act of 
2002.  
b. The Regulation of Interception of Communications Act, 2010 
In September 2010, after the July 11, 2010, terrorist attack in Kampala, Uganda 
passed the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act.126 The act provides for 
security agencies to apply for a warrant to a designated judge to surveil or intercept any 
person’s electronic communication, meeting, postal package, mail, or fax suspected to be 
linked with terrorism. In addition, it authorizes, among others, the searching of any 
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premise, and access to any one’s bank account suspected to be associated with terrorist 
activities.127 In justifying the urgency to enact the law, some leaders in government argue 
that, had this law been in place, the Kampala terrorist attack would have been averted.128  
Similarly, Tumushabe explains that the reason for empowering security agents to conduct 
interception and surveillance on suspicious communications and individuals is to ensure 
safety and freedoms of all citizens, and to protect the national economy against 
terrorism.129 Terrorists, like all criminals, typically plan secretly, and unless security 
agencies are empowered to penetrate the terrorist’s covert activities, counterterrorism 
would be difficult to enforce. 
The act has been criticized by human rights activists, lawyers, and journalists for 
interfering with fundamental rights to freedom. Journalists also argue that the law 
imperils the confidentiality of media sources and could undermine the media’s 
investigative role. Also, telephone providers feel the law poses an economic burden to 
their businesses because it obligates them to incur an extra cost of $10 million to $15 
million in purchasing the relevant interception equipment. This cost would, in turn, be 
passed over to the public, making communication more expensive.130  
Still, the Regulation of Interception of Communications Act, 2010, is an effective 
counterterrorism measure in Uganda. Despite several terrorist threats to attack Uganda, 
after July 11, security has been able to detect, prevent, and investigate such threats. For 
example, in September 2014, Uganda’s security intercepted a communication between an 
Al Shabaab terrorist cell in Kampala and an Al Qaeda cell in the Islamic Maghreb 
planning to bomb Uganda’s Luzira Maximum prison to free the eight suspected terrorists 
under trial for masterminding the July 11, 2010, terrorist attacks. The police took 
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preventive counterterrorism measures to stop the attack.131 The success of such a plan by 
the terrorists would have had devastating effects on the stability of the country and the 
region, given the extent of loss the July 2010 terrorist incident caused.   
c. The Anti-money Laundering Act, 2013 
In October 2013, Uganda passed the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA). The 
act criminalizes money laundering and provides for penalties including seizure, freezing, 
and forfeiting assets associated with terrorists.132 The act also provides a framework for 
establishing systems to prevent, detect, and investigate money laundering. It also lists 
measures to be taken by finance agencies such as identification of individual clients, 
record keeping, and reporting suspicious transactions.133 Furthermore, the act provides 
for the establishment of a Finance Intelligence Authority, whose primary function is to 
receive regular intelligence reports from all financial institutions on money laundering.134  
While the AMLA is an effective counterterrorism tool in preventing, detecting, 
and investigating terrorism financing, its implementation could be undermined by 
institutional weaknesses. Peter Edopu observes that corruption and poor recordkeeping 
within most of the financial institutions are likely to undermine effective monitoring of 
suspects.135 He also argues that because of competition, especially among non-bank 
institutions, bureaucratic processes that are likely to delay customers—such as obtaining 
their detailed particulars—are avoided.136 Such loopholes can be exploited by terrorists 
to conduct their activities and penetrate Uganda’s porous borders undetected.  
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d. Anti-terrorism Amendment Bill, 2015  
Even though in November 2003, Uganda ratified the United Nations Conventions 
on terrorism financing and is a founding member of the East Africa and South Africa 
Anti-Money Laundering Group, its anti-terrorist law did not specifically address 
terrorism financing.137 To strengthen counterterrorism measures and also harmonize its 
law with the regional and international anti-terrorism regime, Uganda, in June 2015, 
passed the Anti-Terrorism Amendment Bill, 2015. The bill seeks to strengthen the power 
of the Inspector General of Police (IGP) over the control of terrorism financing. Under 
the bill, provided the IGP has sufficient evidence, he or she can freeze, seize, and forfeit 
assets and property linked to terrorists.138 The bill also seeks to deter terrorism by 
providing for a stiff sentence—20 years’ imprisonment or a fine not exceeding Uganda 
Shs.10 billion ($5,464,600)—to anyone convicted of providing or collecting funds to 
support terrorism.139  
Civil society activists and opposition politicians criticize the bill on the grounds 
that the government may use “terrorism” as a pretext to harass and spy on political 
opponents. For example, they argue that section 17A and 17B of the bill gives the IGP   
absolute powers to freeze, seize, or forfeit assets of individuals linked to terrorists. In this 
regard, they claim, the IGP is an investigator, prosecutor, and a judge.140  They further 
argue that the bill does not clearly define who is a terrorist and that the definition of 
terrorist activities is too broad, ambiguous, and subject to manipulation.141 On the other 
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hand, proponents of the bill argue that the existing law has gaps; for example, it is silent 
on terrorism financing.  
These gaps must be addressed through amendment of the law. Also, they argue 
that the purpose of the amendment is to align the Uganda Anti-Terrorism Act with the 
United Nations Conventions on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1999.142  Uganda, having 
ratified the international conventions on counterterrorism, is under obligation to align its 
anti-terrorism laws to the international regime. Besides, alignment would ensure 
safeguards and protection against excesses that would be in conflict with other 
international laws, such as the international human rights law. Despite the criticism of the 
bill and resentment by the opposition politicians, nevertheless, the bill was passed 
democratically, because it was debated by civil society and passed by a majority vote in 
parliament. 
 Enforcement Measures 2.
As law enforcers, the national police is the leading anti-terrorism agency in 
Uganda. In its counterterrorism efforts, it is supported by the intelligence community. 
Uganda’s intelligence community comprises the Internal Security Organization (ISO), the 
External Security Organization, Crime Intelligence (CI), and the Military Intelligence 
(MI).143 Border control is a joint function of police, intelligence, immigration, and 
customs. Because of the nature of the terrorist threat in Uganda and given its unique 
capabilities, strength, and training, the military is also a key player in Uganda’s 
counterterrorism effort.  
b. Police Operations 
Following the escalation of terrorist attacks by the ADF in Kampala between 
1998 and 2002, the Uganda police established the Police Anti-Terrorism Unit (PATU), 
under the Special Branch department. In 2007, the Special Branch was disbanded and 
PATU placed under a newly created Directorate of Counter Terrorism. Since then, a 
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number of other specialized anti-terrorism units have been established under the 
Directorate of Counterterrorism. These include the following: the Very Important Persons 
Protection Unit, the Aviation Police Unit, the Intelligence Police Unit, the Bomb 
Disposal Unit, the Canine Police Unit, and the Tourism Police Unit.144 The establishment 
of these units has enabled Uganda’s police to develop diverse skills and capacity in 
managing the terrorist threat. For example, the Tourism Police Unit, with 100 officers 
attached to Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), is charged with providing security to 
tourists and investigating wildlife crimes such as poaching and illegal dealing in animal 
trophies, including ivory that is smuggled to fund terrorist activities.145 Besides 
employment of technical skills, the police have promoted mass mobilization as a measure 
to counterterrorism. 
Through community policing, communities are sensitized in detecting suspected 
terrorists or their materials and promptly reporting to security.146 Community policing is 
based on the principle that security begins with the individual, and every individual has a 
constitutional obligation to protect the nation. Asan Kasingye argues, “Police 
effectiveness and public order cannot be enhanced unless the community is persuaded to 
do more for itself.”147 He perceives the community as “an agent and partner in promoting 
security rather than as a passive audience.”148 Onesmus Bilaliwoalos observes that most 
people have good will, and their readiness to cooperate is important to build a 
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harmonious community.149  On the whole, the general consensus among scholars is that 
because individuals have a stake in their own safety, community policing is a popular 
counterterrorism measure.  
In the event, since the July 11, 2010, terrorist attack in Kampala, Uganda has not 
experienced another large-scale terrorist attack, save for the isolated cases of targeted 
assassinations. In his study of the region, David Goldman observes that “the situation in 
Uganda is more assuring and it shows a better understanding of how to deal with 
terror.”150 One of the reasons for this relatively stable situation is the robust community 
policing approach. The main idea about community policing is that “if you see 
something, say something.”151 The community police approach is an effective 
counterterrorism measure because with minimum resources, intelligence can be received 
in real time over the entire country.  
To enhance border security, the police deploy personnel to patrol the porous 
borders, focusing on the illegal paths—the “panya routes.” In addition, police 
counterterrorism experts are attached to field teams to ensure professionalism and 
effectiveness.152 Furthermore, the police employ the notion of “target hardening,” which 
involves increasing the visibility of its uniformed personnel at vital installations that are 
likely terrorist targets.153 Such installations include power stations, bridges, and key 
government premises. In addition, the police issue terror alerts to the public according to 
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intelligence received about imminent terrorist attacks.154 The alerts increase public 
vigilance against terrorism and are effective in averting likely terrorist surprise attacks. 
b. Immigration Controls 
To facilitate effective tracking of suspected transnational criminals, especially 
terrorists crossing borders, Uganda introduced the Personal Identification Secure 
Comparison System (PISCES).155 The system is in use at Entebbe International Airport 
and other key entry points like Busia and Malaba on the Kenya-eastern border, Katuna on 
the Rwanda-southwestern border, and Mpondwe at the DRC-western border.156 The 
PISCES is a good counterterrorist tool that captures data from travelers’ passports about 
their movements. This facility enables Uganda Intelligence to profile suspects and share 
information with regional and international stakeholders.  
To address the problem of inadequate manpower in the Immigration Department 
and improve border security, last June, the government of Uganda recruited 150 young 
graduates. This recruitment will increase the country’s immigration personnel by 50 
percent.157 The young officers are undergoing a nine-month special immigration course 
that focuses on border security, including detecting transnational crimes, especially 
terrorism and money laundering.158 With the large number of personnel recruited, the ill-
                                                 
154 “Police Issues Another Terror Alert,” The Monitor, April 3, 2015, http://www.upf.go.ug/police-
issues-another-terror-alert/. 
155 East African Community, The First Meeting of the Regional e-Immigration Working 




157 Shifa Mwesigye, “Uganda: First National ID Set for September,” All Africa, May 27, 2014, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201405280349.html. 
158 Aronda Nyakairima, Statement of the Minister of Internal Affairs on the Recruitment of 
Immigration Officer Trainees and Immigration Assistant Trainees (Kampala, Uganda: Republic of Uganda, 




manned entry points along Uganda’s porous borders will be reinforced; more border 
points could be gazetted to improve border control and check infiltration by terrorists.159 
In December 2014, Uganda began the process of issuing national identity cards to 
its citizens. Before then, citizens used multiple identity documents including voter’s 
cards, school IDs, driving permits, and introductory letters from local council leaders for 
identification.160 This situation complicated security vetting and tracking of criminal 
suspects and also provided easy infiltration to terrorist elements into the country. The 
issuance of national IDs by the government of Uganda will strengthen the 
counterterrorism measures in the country.  
Also, to further strengthen border security, last year, the Uganda government 
started the process of procuring e-passports to replace the current ones that are easy to 
forge. The e-passports will include security biometrics such as iris data and finger prints; 
forging them will be difficult.161 The use of e-passports will be a significant progression 
in Uganda’s counterterrorism efforts. As a result of these initiatives, the Uganda 
government will now be able to build a comprehensive national database, which will 
assist security institutions to monitor who enters and who leaves the country and also 
prevent infiltration of terrorists at the borders.  
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c. Customs Control 
In exercising their mandate of ensuring border security, enforcement officials 
must balance the enforcement of public safety and facilitating the smooth flow of goods 
and services across the borders. In July 2010, Uganda, with the four other partner states, 
ratified the East African Community (EAC) Common Market Protocol.162 With this 
protocol, goods, services, labor, and capital are able to freely flow among EAC states.163 
To minimize the problem of lack of coordination among departments and agencies at the 
border points, it was agreed to establish One Stop Border Posts (OSBP). In this 
arrangement, border security—comprising members of the Joint Intelligence Committee 
(JIC), immigration, and customs officials—operate together in the OSBP.164 The OSBPs 
focus on a harmonized approach in which the various border officials work together in 
terms of verification, data capture, and clearing of goods and services.165 The use of 
OBSPs minimizes delays due to repetition of activities, maximizes tax collection, and 
enhances national security. On the whole, the synchronization of the robust immigration-
control measures coupled with cohesive, well-coordinated customs and border-security 
systems will enhance Uganda’s counterterrorism efforts.  
B. INTELLIGENCE APPROACH  
Uganda’s intelligence community comprises the External Intelligence 
Organization (ESO), the ISO, the MI, and the CI. The ESO and ISO are civilian 
organizations established by the Security Organizations Act, 1987.166 Their main 
function is to collect and process foreign and domestic intelligence, respectively, about 
Uganda. They also advise and make recommendations to the president on action to be 
taken in view of collected intelligence. On the other hand, Military Intelligence collects 
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intelligence for the execution of military policies, plans, and programs.167  The CI 
collects intelligence on serious crimes for the police investigation department.168 The MI 
and CI form an essential part of the national intelligence structure.  
Before the 1998 ADF terrorist attacks in Uganda’s capital, intelligence sharing 
and cooperation among security agencies was weak. The weak cooperation among the 
agencies could be traced from Uganda’s turbulent history. Africa and Kwadjo, in their 
research observed that in 1986 when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) usurped 
power, the country was in ruins; “the armed forces were in disarray and the intelligence 
services discredited.”169 He  further  notes that though Uganda’s military has been able to 
undertake significant reforms, especially after enacting the Uganda Peoples’ Defense 
Forces Act 2005; no parallel reforms have happened in security agencies, save for 
organizing them under a clear legal framework after enacting the Security Act 1987.170 
Arguably by the 1990s, the security agencies lacked experience, skill, and resources to 
effectively operate as state institutions, hence the weak cooperation.   In 1999, however, 
overwhelmed by the intensity of terrorist explosions in the city, the intelligence agencies 
joined hands to form the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATT) to counter the 
terrorists. In 2000, to strengthen, coordinate, and improve oversight on security 
operations in the country, the National Security Act was enacted.171  
Besides providing for the formation of the National Security Council (NSC), it 
also provides for the formation of JIC at the National, the District and the Sub-County 
Levels.172 The JIC comprise members of the intelligence agencies. The Joint Anti-
Terrorism Unit (JATT) and JIC have played a significant part in countering terrorism in 
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Uganda, despite the allegations of human rights abuses by JATT. To date, the police 
operate jointly with JIC teams and military units to secure the borders.173 The 
establishment of enabling laws in Uganda and the empowerment of enforcement agencies 
has facilitated counterterrorism efforts in the country. Though the laws have supported 
intelligence agencies in conducting counterterrorism operations, they too, have created 
limitations. For example, Chapter 4, Article 23(4)(b) of Uganda’s Constitution states that 
any person 
arrested or detained upon reasonable suspicion of his or her having 
committed or being about to commit a criminal offence under the laws of 
Uganda, shall, if not earlier released, be brought to court as soon as 
possible but in any case not later than 48 hours from the time of his or her 
arrest.174 
The police and security authorities argue that the law is unrealistic because 
adducing concrete evidence to secure successful prosecution, especially for complex 
cases like terrorism, needs more time to investigate.175 Recommendations have been 
made to amend the law. The proponents for amendment further argue that even more 
advanced democracies like Britain have amended the law to allow 90 days of detention 
without trial.176  
Suspicious of likely abuse of the law, human rights activists and opposition 
politicians argue against amendment. They opine that the remedy is in improving 
efficiency in the investigation, prosecution, and judicial arms of government, and not 
amending the law. They also suggest increased facilitation to these organs of 
government.177 In all, the effectiveness of intelligence in the counterterrorism effort in 
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Uganda will depend on political will to reform intelligence, support it through 
strengthening the existing laws, and providing the necessary resources. 
C. MILITARY APPROACH  
As noted, Uganda’s military has for a long time engaged ADF and LRA terrorists 
based in the DRC, the CAR, and South Sudan, where they have safe havens. Besides, 
Uganda’s military is part of the regional effort to engage Al Shabaab terrorists in 
Somalia. Kristof Titeca and Koen Vlassenroot observe that the deployment of the Uganda 
Peoples’ Defense Force (UPDF) along the porous Uganda/DRC border in 1999 weakened 
the ADF and significantly curtailed terrorist infiltration into the country.178 Internally, 
apart from guarding the national borders against terrorist infiltration, the military also 
conducts joint operations with the police. Section 42–45 of the Uganda Peoples’ Defense 
Forces Act, 2005, allows the military to provide support to civil authority upon 
request.179 In July 2014, for example, upon getting an alert of a likely terrorist attack on 
Entebbe International Airport and other undefined targets in Uganda’s capital, Kampala, 
the military, police, and intelligence agencies massively deployed.180 Such joint 
military/police deployments enhance “target hardening” and visibility of the forces; it 
also acts as a strong deterrence measure against terrorism. 
Apart from supporting police in countering terrorism, the military in Uganda also 
supports the wildlife department in terms of training and personnel. To ensure the 
security of tourists, (in 2005), the government established the Special Wildlife Tourism 
Intervention Force (SWIFT).181 The force was established after the Bwindi National Park 
terrorist incident at the western border, in which eight tourists from the United States and 
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Europe were killed by terrorists. The SWIFT comprises UPDF personnel and UWA 
rangers. The joint force’s main task is to guard the national parks against infiltration by 
terrorists and to secure tourists.182 Since the deployment of the military in support of the 
wildlife department, no significant case of terrorism has occurred.  
As a result of improved security, wildlife in the protected areas has grown, and in 
the last 10 years, tourism in Uganda has expanded fivefold. Today, Uganda is rated 
among countries with the fastest rate of growth of tourism in Africa.183 A combination of 
stringent anti-terrorism legislation, coupled with enforcement and military operations 
have contributed to a strong counterterrorism policy in Uganda. 
D. DIPLOMATIC APPROACH 
Diplomacy plays a central role in fighting international terrorism. Cofer Black 
explains that “diplomacy is the instrument of power that builds political will and 
strengthens international cooperation.”184 He further notes that through diplomacy, 
terrorists are denied access to resources upon which their survival depends.185 To win 
legitimacy and build a positive image in its fight against terrorism, Uganda employs the 
diplomatic approach.  
Bilateral relations among states facilitate counterterrorism efforts. Daniel Bayman 
argues that counterterrorism is more effectively fought in a bilateral context than a 
multilateral setting.186 He explains that because of the complexity of varying interests 
and constraints among states in a multilateral setting, harmonization of policies and laws 
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is difficult.187 In its war against terrorism, Uganda has developed bilateral relations with 
a number of countries. For example, in 2010, before the collapse of the state, the 
government of the Central African Republic (CAR) allowed the Uganda government to 
deploy its military to neutralize the LRA, which had established safe havens in the 
eastern region of the country and was terrorizing the local population.188 This bilateral 
understanding between Uganda and the CAR formed the foundation for the future 
deployment of the African Union Regional Task Force (AU-RTF) to hunt for the LRA 
terrorists. In March 2002, similar diplomatic initiatives were undertaken between the 
Uganda government and the Khartoum government in pursuance of the LRA in southern 
Sudan.189 As a result of these bilateral initiatives, Uganda has not only incapacitated the 
ADF and LRA terrorists, but also kept its porous borders secure. 
 The country has developed strong bilateral relations with the advanced states, 
especially the United States, in its fight against terrorism. As a result of the relations, the 
U.S. government has supported Uganda in terms of training, technical intelligence, and 
logistical support, which have been key in the county’s counterterrorism program.190 
Similar bilateral relations have been developed with Canada, Britain, Turkey, France, 
Kenya, Ethiopia, and other countries actively engaged in the fight against terrorism. 
Canada for example, closely supported Uganda during the failed peace settlement with 
the LRA in 2008. It also assists in training the UPDF in preparation for deployment 
against Al Shabaab terrorists in Somalia.191 
Peter Peterson underscores the use of credible and neutral messengers in 
conveying messages of terrorism to the international community as an effective 
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diplomatic tool.192 In July 2013, Ugandan officials worked jointly with the U.S.-based 
Non-Governmental Organization, The Invisible Children, to conduct a conference of civil 
society and government leaders of the DRC, CAR, and Uganda on the LRA.193 A senior 
LRA defector, one “Major General” Ceasar Acellam, a former intelligence chief of the 
LRA, was invited to address the conference. He revealed the atrocities of the LRA and 
appealed to his former colleagues to defect as well. The defection of Acellam and his 
testimony were widely publicized in the local and foreign media. It boosted support for 
Uganda’s counterterrorism effort.194   
Arising from the publicity of a video by The Invisible Children, coupled with 
other diplomatic approaches earlier mentioned, the U.S. government signed “The Lord’s 
Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009.” The White 
House explained: “The Act provides for the U.S government to assist the regional 
governments of DRC, CAR, South Sudan and Uganda, put LRA leader Joseph Kony out 
of the battle field and halt the activities of LRA.”195 On the whole, like the enforcement, 
intelligence, and military approaches to counterterrorism, the diplomatic approach has 
been a significant tool in Uganda’s counterterrorism policy.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Uganda’s counterterrorism policy is shaped by the international counterterrorism 
regime and also by the terrorist threat the country has suffered since the early 1990s. The 
multifaceted approach in the employment of a combination of law enforcement, 
intelligence, military pressure, and diplomatic counterterrorism measures has enabled 
Uganda to control its porous borders and contain the threat of terrorism, albeit the July 
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11, 2010, terrorist attacks in Kampala. The main strength in Uganda’s counterterrorism 
efforts lies in the establishment of strong anti-terrorism laws, the synergy within its 
security forces, and the professionalism of its military. However, Uganda’s lack of a 
formal, comprehensive, and well-articulated counterterrorism strategy could undermine 
the sustainability of the efforts in place and also endanger the security of its porous 
borders against terrorism. 
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IV. REGIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN EAST 
AFRICA 
“If we do not hang together, we will surely hang separately.”196 
—Benjamin Franklin  
Trans-border terrorism can only be contained through bilateral and regional 
cooperation.197 In the last decade, African states and regional bodies have embraced the 
strategy of regional and international cooperation to combat transnational terrorist 
activities. The threat of terrorism in East Africa is directly related to and influenced by 
the activities of Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda operating across borders in the Horn of Africa. 
This chapter examines the regional framework of counterterrorism in East Africa.198  
A. AFRICAN UNION COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN EAST AFRICA  
Though efforts to combat terrorism by the African Union intensified after 9/11, 
there had been earlier efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU—the 
predecessor to the AU) to put in place mechanisms for cooperation in combating 
terrorism by member states. For example, in June 1994, in Tunisia, African leaders 
signed a Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations. The declaration 
criminalized “all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism.”199 The leaders resolved to 
cooperate in fighting terrorism on the continent to ensure stability and development.200 
Also, in July 1999, in Algiers, the African leaders endorsed the Convention on the 
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Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (the Algeria Convention). Importantly, this 
agreement provides a definition that distinguishes acts of terrorism from acts relating to 
the struggle for freedom and self-determination.201 Article three of the agreement states, 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, the struggle waged by 
peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their 
liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against 
colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces 
shall not be considered as terrorist acts.202 
Ewi and Anig observe that because the African definition of terrorism was drawn 
from its recent historical context, particularly the struggle against colonialism, and that 
the process of consolidating Africa’s independence was ongoing, for legal clarity, it was 
necessary to distinguish terrorism from liberation struggles with a just cause.203 
Furthermore, the AU architecture provides a clear legal framework that supports 
member states and regional blocks in their efforts to combat terrorism. Article 4(o) of the 
Constitutive Act of the AU (2000) condemns acts of terrorism and subversion. The article 
states, “The Union shall function in accordance with the following principles… respect 
for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political 
assassination, acts of terrorism, and subversive activities.”204 In addition, in July 2004, 
the African Union established the African Centre for Study and Research of Terrorism 
(ACSRT) with the following tasks:  
organizing functions aimed at improving counterterrorism capacities and 
cooperation among AU member states…(b) provide capacity-building 
assistance to enhance national and regional capabilities, (c) create a 
mechanism for all member states to access expert guidance, (d) build a 
database to facilitate sharing of intelligence and other related terrorism 
information; (e) harmonize and standardize domestic legal frameworks 
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within AU member states and international counterterrorism frameworks; 
and (f) disseminate counterterrorism research across the continent.205 
The ACSRT is responsible to the AU Commission; it interacts with member states 
through national Focal Points and coordinates with regional and international 
stakeholders such as the European Union (EU), the UN Counter Terrorism Committee 
(CTC), and the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) over counterterrorism 
matters.206 However, because of financial  and  personnel constraints, ACSRT has not 
delivered much on its core functions, such as building a coherent data base and 
effectively supporting the national Focal Points. For its operations, the Centre largely 
depends on external donors, particularly the European Union.207 
With the authority of the UN, the AU has deployed troops to combat terrorism in 
the Horn of Africa by Al Shabaab and the LRA in the Central African Republic (CAR). 
In January 2007, at its 69th Meeting, the African Union Peace Security Council (AUPSC) 
formed the African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) with a mandate to protect the Somali 
Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), enable the conduct of humanitarian operations, 
and ensure security to facilitate development of Somalia. Additionally, AMISOM is 
mandated to support the Somali forces in the conduct of disarmament operations and 
assist in the settlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs).208 The AU leadership 
hoped that when the Somali institutions are restored, the country would develop, people’s 
way of life would improve, and in turn, terrorism would effectively be managed at the 
source. Consequently, spillover effects into the region would be minimized.  
Among the spillover effects is the uncontrolled flow of illegal arms and 
ammunition from Somalia because of the porous borders. Bandits in the region have 
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accessed the arms and used them to terrorize the civilian population.209 The AU 
counterterrorism framework is supported by regional bodies, which offer political 
leadership and coordinate efforts in addressing the fundamental drivers of terrorism in the 
region. 
B. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL BODIES IN COMBATING TERRORISM IN 
EAST AFRICA 
Benedikt Franke correctly observes that “Africa’s emerging peace and security 
architecture rests on a careful balance and clear division of labor between the continental 
and regional layers of inter-African security cooperation.”210 The Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), East African Community (EAC), and International 
Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) are the three East African regional 
bodies supporting counterterrorism in the region. Their membership is as follows: 
IGAD—Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, and Uganda; EAC—
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda;  ICGLR—Anglo, Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Republic of Congo, 
South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Because regional bodies are 
comprised of individuals with expertise and deep understanding of local situations, they 
assist in evolving appropriate policies and strategies.211 For example, as a result of its 
understanding of the region, the IGAD has been supporting the AU and strategic partners 
in managing the terrorist threat in Somalia, including coordinating regional meetings and 
planning for the final deployment of AMISOM regional forces. Similarly, from 2012 to 
2013, the ICGLR played a significant role in the establishment of the United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo-Intervention Brigade 
(MONUSCO-IB), which has led to the weakening of the ADF terrorists in Eastern DRC. 
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Since its inception in 1986, the IGAD has been a rallying point for the region, the 
AU, and the international community in coordinating counterterrorism efforts.212 In 
2006, with the funding and technical support of the EU, the IGAD Capacity building 
Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT) was established to promote justice, enhance inter-
agency coordination on counterterrorism among member states, focus on border security, 
provide training, and promote cooperation and information sharing among member 
states.213  In 2009, the IGAD adopted the Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) and 
Extradition Conventions. This is a significant tool in cross-border law enforcement and 
criminal justice within member states in combating terrorists.214 Similarly, within the 
EAC states, legal frameworks have been made to facilitate extradition of terrorist 
suspects. In some cases, the effectiveness of the legal framework has been undermined by 
bureaucracy and weaknesses in national institutions; however, political intervention and 
cooperation among security agencies has unlocked such impediments. It is out of such 
cooperation that 13 Kenyans suspected in the July 11, 2010, terrorist attack in Kampala 
were handed over to Uganda by the Kenyan government. Similarly, last June, Jamil 
Mukulu, leader of the ADF, was handed over by the Tanzania government to Uganda to 
answer for the terrorist charges against him.215  Figure 2 depicts Jamil Mukulu.  
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Figure 2.  ADF Leader Jamil Mukulu, Extradited from Tanzania to 
Uganda on July 12, 2015. 
 
Source:  Sean MacCormac, “ADF Leader Jamil Mukulu Arrested,” Center for Security 
Policy, April 30, 2015, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/04/30/adf-leader-
jamil-mukulu-arrested   
Without these regional bodies, combating terrorism in the region would not be 
possible. The regional bodies have helped diffuse intra- and inter-state hostilities among 
member states, which, if not resolved, would undermine efforts to combat terrorists in the 
region. Such hostility includes tensions between Rwanda and Tanzania, the DRC and 
Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda, Kenya and Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, among others. 
Through meetings conducted by the IGAD, EAC, and ICGLR, confidence-building 
measures have been undertaken, mistrust reduced and the strategic objectives of fighting 
terrorism maintained. 
To maintain the strategic focus on terrorism, the regional bodies coordinate and 
organize regular meetings of heads of state, ministers of defense, and chiefs of services of 
the armed forces, security heads, and other relevant individuals to assess and address the 
terror threat in the region. For example, in May 2015, the ICGLR convened a summit in 
Angola; the heads of state and government strongly encouraged proactive sharing of 
intelligence among all ICGLR member states, building early warning mechanisms, 
intensifying border control and consolidating regional efforts to combat terrorism in the 
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region.216 The regional bodies have assisted the East African region to rationalize and 
cooperate in the use of resources. In May 2013, with the support of the British 
government, a regional Intelligence Fusion Centre for East Africa was opened in Nairobi-
Kenya. The center is fitted with a modern forensic laboratory and investigation 
equipment that is available for use by member states.217  
African states and regional bodies on their own lack the financial, technical, and 
material capacity to effectively deal with terrorism in the region. The international 
community, particularly Africa’s strategic partners, including the UN, the U.S. 
government, and the European Union (EU), have been working closely with the continent 
through regional and bi-lateral cooperation to combat terrorism. Figure 3 depicts the 
counterterrorism framework for the East African region.  
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Figure 3.  East African Regional Counterterrorism Framework 
 
 
C. AFRICA UNION FORCES  
Presently, there are two AU forces fighting terrorists in the East African region, 
the Africa Union-Regional Task Force (AU-RTF) and AMISOM forces. Though 
MONUSCO-IB, like the other two forces, is composed of regional troops, it is not an AU 
but a UN force. 
1. AU-RTF 
Following the defeat of the LRA in northern Uganda in 2006, the rebels fled to 
the eastern DRC, established bases in Garamba National Park, and continued to terrorize 
civilians. Between 2006 and 2008, pressure from the UPDF compelled the LRA to 
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request peace talks with the Uganda government. At the last moment, the LRA leader, 
Joseph Kony, refused to turn up in Juba-South Sudan to sign the negotiated peace 
agreement.218 The LRA returned to the bush and resumed its terror against civilians in 
the eastern DRC, South Sudan, and the CAR. Regional and international actors, including 
the African Union, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), U.S. Africa Command 
(AFRICOM), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the EU, and civil 
society organizations raised concern about the impunity of the LRA against the 
unprotected civilians in the region.219  
The LRA’s marauding elements traversed the unsecured borders of the DRC, 
South Sudan, CAR, and Sudan, causing havoc. In response to these acts of terror, in 
2001, the U.S. State Department included the LRA on its Terrorist Exclusion List and 
designated Joseph Kony a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” under Executive 
Order 13324. In 2011, the African Union designated the LRA as a terrorist group and 
directed the four affected states (DRC, CAR, South Sudan, and Uganda) to constitute a 
regional force to deal with it.220 In October 2011, the U.S government deployed 100 
Special Forces personnel to give technical and logistical support to the UPDF and also to 
coordinate plans that would encourage LRA defections.221  
In 2012, the UN Security Council endorsed a regional strategy to counter the 
LRA, which has been operating in CAR, Congo, and South Sudan, since its defeat in 
northern Uganda in 2006.222 It also mandated the AU to constitute a regional force to 
eliminate the LRA from its safe havens in CAR and the DRC. The strategy has four main 
objectives, including ensuring security of civilians; arresting or eliminating Joseph Kony 
and his senior commanders; aiding defection of LRA combatants; conducting 
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disarmament, demobilization, and resettlement of LRA combatants; and supplying relief 
to societies affected by the LRA. On September 18, 2012, a force comprising troops from 
Uganda and South Sudan was formally inaugurated as the AU-RTF. However, CAR and 
the DRC have not contributed troops because of domestic challenges at home.223 Failure 
by CAR and the DRC to contribute troops to the AU-RTF force undermined operational 
efficiency. The LRA was able to scatter over the extensive jungle region, which could not 
be effectively controlled by the small regional force comprising Uganda and a few troops 
of South Sudan. However, the support by the U.S Special Forces assisted to fill the gap, 
hence weakening the LRA. 
2. AMISOM  
After the fall of President Siad Barre in 1991 and the collapse of the Somali state, 
the country fell into the hands of warlords, clan militias, and youth Muslim extremists. In 
2006, the Muslim youth extremists backed by Al Qaeda formed Al Shabaab and launched 
a guerilla war against  the recently formed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 
Somalia, supported by Ethiopian forces. The failure by Ethiopia to stabilize the situation 
in Somalia led the IGAD and AU to decide on a peacekeeping mission to Somalia, 
comprising regional forces. The UNSC Resolution 1744 (2007) was passed authorizing 
the AU to deploy troops in Somalia. As earlier stated, in January 2007 at its 69th 
meeting, the AUPSC established AMISOM.  
In March 2007, Uganda deployed the first AMISOM contingent to Somalia, 
comprising 1,400 troops. In December 2007, Burundi also deployed a contingent 
comprising a battle group—an infantry battalion reinforced with armoured elements. 
Consequently, Kenya, Djibouti, Sierra Leon, and Ethiopia deployed troops between 2011 
and 2013 in accordance with UNSC resolutions.224 Africa’s strategic partners, in 
particular the U.S government and later the EU, joined the regional effort by supplying 
the AMISOM forces with the badly needed logistics, training, and finance. Since 2011, 
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the Al Shabaab has been compelled to abandon its safe havens, it has lost key 
commanders to the U.S.-led drone attacks and it has been deprived of millions of dollars 
in revenues from strategic ports and forced taxes (zakat).225  
Many scholars observe that Al Shabaab’s loss of strategic towns such as 
Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kisimayo, Afgoye, Dinsor, Barawe, and Bardhere since 2011 is a 
sign of a weakened force; its embrace of asymmetric tactics is not a manifestation of 
strength, but weakness.226 Aundrey Cronin argues that historical case studies confirm 
that the use of deliberate and violent attacks on unarmed civilians undermines local 
support to terrorists and eventually to the collapse of the group.227 In 2013, Bruce 
Hoffman acknowledged that the ejection of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu by the 
AMISOM and Somali forces weakened Al Shabaab in Somalia, but he also observed that 
the terrorists still had a strong hold in South Somalia, upon which they could 
reorganize.228 Noel Anderson argues that the Al Shabaab withdraw from the urban areas 
is not out of defeat but a tactical maneuver to preserve itself.229 Arguably, it is evident 
that despite the pressure exerted on Al Shabaab, the terrorists remain potent; unless the 
challenge of porous borders in the region is addressed, they have the potential to continue 
crossing over and causing mayhem. 
D. AFRICAN UNION’S STRATEGIC PARTNERS 
African states and regional bodies on their own may lack the financial, technical, 
and material capacity to effectively deal with terrorism in the region. The African Union 
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strategic partners work closely with the continent both at the regional and bi-lateral levels 
in countering terrorism; they include the UN, the European Union, and the United States.  
 MONUSCO-Intervention Brigade (MONUSCO-IB) 1.
Like Somalia, the Eastern DRC over decades has suffered a state breakdown. In 
1999, the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en Re ́publique Démocratique du 
Congo (UN MONUC) was established with a narrow mandate of, among others, 
monitoring the implementation of cease-fire agreements nad supervising and verifying 
disengagement and redeployment of ex-combatants.230 In July 2010, it down-scaled its 
forces in the DRC and was renamed the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).231 Taking advantage of the absence of 
state control, more than 25 local and foreign armed groups emerged in the Eastern DRC, 
including Uganda’s ADF and LRA terrorist groups. The availability of safe havens 
coupled with the porosity of the Eastern/DRC border motivated the Uganda terrorist 
groups to establish bases in the Eastern DRC. In 1996, the then DRC government offered 
ADF rebels safe havens in the mountainous region of eastern Congo; the Sudan 
government provided logistical support and training to the terrorists.232 Because of the 
narrow MONUSCO mandate, the armed groups continued to grow unchallenged.  
Upon the recommendations by the ICGLR to the AU and the signed “Peace, 
Security and Cooperation Framework for DRC and the Region,” in February 2013, the 
UN Security Council passed Resolution 2098 (2012), creating the Intervention Brigade 
within the MONUSCO. It authorized the Brigade to “take all necessary measures to carry 
out targeted operations to prevent expansion of all armed groups in DRC, neutralize these 
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groups and to disarm them.”233 The ADF, LRA, FDLR, and other armed groups are 
targets.  
The intervention force is composed of contingents from regional member states 
including Tanzania, Malawi, and South Africa.234 The composition of the special brigade 
deliberately excludes non-African TCCs, based on the conviction by regional leaders that 
UN peacekeepers in the DRC lack the commitment to fight. In 2013, while addressing an 
ICGLR Summit in Kampala over the crisis in the Eastern DRC and the incompetence of 
MONUSCO in dealing with the situation, the Ugandan president described the UN troops 
not as peacekeepers but, “a bunch of military tourists.”235 Relatedly, a Uruguayan 
platoon commander, when asked why his force does not ensure peace in the DRC, 
explained that, “I have to make the right decision for everyone concerned. I have a wife 
and a son back home. My men have families too. I want us to get out there, but it’s not 
safe.”236 The apathy of the UN personnel in dealing with terrorist groups in the DRC and 
other negative armed groups and the rigid mandate by the UN partly explain the survival 
of terrorism in the region. It also calls on regional leaders to initiate regional solutions to 
regional problems.  
Since January 2014, Congolese forces, supported by the newly established 
MONUSCO-Intervention Brigade, launched operations against the ADF terrorists and 
flushed them out of their safe havens. The ADF has suffered significant losses, the 
surviving combatants are now in disarray, and as earlier mentioned, its leader Jamil 
Mukulu, was arrested in Tanzania and extradited to Uganda.237 Having no clear objective 
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and lack of command, with sustained momentum by the MONUSCO-IB and DRC forces, 
the pressure by the DRC and UN force, if sustained, could mark the end of the ADF.  
 The EU 2.
The Horn of Africa has had historical ties with European states since colonial 
times. In addition, the EU is the biggest development partner with the region; it offers the 
most foreign humanitarian and economic support and hosts the biggest number of 
diaspora from the troubled Horn of Africa.238 The growth of terrorism and the influence 
of Al Qaeda in the Horn of Africa threaten Europe’s peace and interests in Africa. For 
example, in 2009, two French intelligence officers were kidnapped from a hotel in 
Mogadishu. One of them was soon killed, and in January 2013, the French special forces 
launched a rescue operation on Al Shabaab in Bulormurar—South of Mogadishu—which 
ended in fiasco.239 In addition to killing the remaining Frenchman, the Al Shabaab 
captors also killed two French SEALS involved in the attack—though 17 Al Shabaab 
were also killed.  
In Britain, two suspects arrested in connection with the 2005 bomb attack on the 
London subway were confirmed to have trained in Somalia with extremists. Also, one 
Abdulkadir Mohammed Abdukadir, aka “Kirima,” a Kenyan of Somali origin, is reported 
to have been coordinating with one Samantha Lewaite, a key suspect in the London 
terrorist attack.240 In the aftermath of the investigations, it was revealed that there were 
several British nationals training in Al Shabaab camps in Mogadishu. These and many 
other incidents explain the need for cooperation and international cooperation in 
combating terrorism. The presence of such foreigners as the British nationals in Al 
Shabaab camps in Somalia highlights the dilemma of porous borders in the fight against 
terrorism; Europeans with an extremist bent are traveling overseas to train, while 
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extremists from Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East are, in the evocative language of 
a recent U.S. Congressional hearing on the subject of foreign fighters with ISIS, “one 
flight away” from their western targets.241  
In 2005, the EU adopted its Strategy for Africa with a focus on promoting 
regional integration, cooperation and connectivity among the states in the Horn of Africa 
to defeat terrorism.242 The cooperation is aimed at “strengthening African self-reliance 
through the empowerment of African partners for successful crisis prevention and 
effective crisis reaction”243 The EU particularly viewed IGAD as a convenient vehicle 
through which the EU could interface with the region and contribute to stabilization of 
the region. In 2006, the EU established the Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism 
(ICAPAT) under IGAD with the main objective of dealing with the fundamental causes 
of terrorism in the region. To facilitate this objective, the EU provided a fund of €1 
billion to the AU-Peace and Security Council, through IGAD, to cover a range of 
programs including counterterrorism, early warning systems, disarmament and other 
security-related activities.244  
In December 2009, “an EU policy on the Horn of Africa—towards a 
Comprehensive Strategy was adopted.”245 The policy aims at committing member states 
to implementing agreed-upon measures that would address root causes of insecurity in 
the Horn of Africa. Between 2008 and 2013, the EU spent €412 million to promote good 
governance in Somalia, with a focus on social-economic projects.246 Military operations, 
per se, are not a panacea for ending terrorism; causes within the environment must be 
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addressed. The European Union, by addressing issues of good governance that ultimately 
target social and economic needs of the Horn of Africa, offers long-term solutions to the 
fight against terrorism in the region. 
Between 2010 and 2013, the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) was 
launched to conduct a training program for Somali National Security Forces in Uganda at 
Bihanga Training School. By December 2012, about 3,000 Somali soldiers had 
undergone training by the EUTM.247 The soldiers have formed the nucleus of a new 
Somali National Army (SNA), which is fighting alongside the AMISOM forces against 
the Al Shabaab terrorists. Figure 4 and Figure 5 show Somali troops at their passing out 
ceremony and a team of European Union trainers, respectively. 
Figure 4.  Somali Soldiers, Trained by the EUTM, March on Parade 
During Their Passing Out Ceremony at Bihanga-Uganda 
 




                                                 
247 Gorm Rye Olsen, “Fighting terrorism in Africa by proxy: the USA and the European Union in 
Somalia and Mali,” European Security 23, no. 3 (February 19, 2014): 298, doi: 10.1080/
09662839.2014.884074. 
 67 
Figure 5.  European Union Trainers at Bihanga-Uganda 
 
Source: Enock Kakande, “Somali soldiers passed out in Uganda,” New Vision, December 
5, 2013, http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/650213-somali-soldiers-passed-out-in-
uganda.html 
In addition to training the Somali forces, the EU supports AMISOM forces in 
terms of personnel allowances, medical care, communication equipment, fuel and 
transport, housing, and maintenance costs. By December 2014, the EU had spent about 
€721 million on AMISOM.248 
 The U.S. Government 3.
The U.S. support to the East African efforts is directed at denying terrorists safe 
havens, to incapacitate their capacity to traverse the porous borders, recruit, and train.249 
The intervention is based on a Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) in which U.S. officers 
coordinate with regional officials to jointly plan counterterrorism strategies. In October 
2008, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) as a component of the 
Africa Command (AFRICOM) was established based in Djibouti. It operates in Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Yemen, and the Seychelles. The CJTF-HOA 
also coordinates and supports anti-terrorism efforts in Tanzania and Uganda. The force 
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has been involved in offering special training to regional troops and rendering logistical 
support, such as airlift of Uganda’s troops in AMISOM.250 Training is conducted under 
the State Department’s African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance 
(ACOTA) program.251 
In 2009, with U.S. backing, regional states including Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, 
Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda established 
the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT). The organization 
focuses on reducing operational capacity of terrorist networks, developing a counter 
terrorism legal framework by member countries, improving border security, and checking 
recruitment and radicalization into violent extremism.252 Through PREACT, the U.S. 
government has supported Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in terms of technical 
intelligence, training of quick response units to protect their borders, and responding to 
terrorist threats.  
In 2013, the U.S. and Uganda government signed an agreement for the funding of 
an Automated Finger Identification System (AFIS) to enhance investigations where 
biometric data is required.253 The use of the biometric data has improved control at 
borders in terms of monitoring terror suspects and information-sharing among domestic 
and regional security agencies.  
By November 1, 2013, the U.S. government had disbursed $42.3 million of the 
$104 million allocated for PREACT since 2009. Because lack of resources is one of the 
greatest challenges of executing effective counterterrorism programs, the financial 
contribution by the U.S. government is a force multiplier in the fight against terrorism in 
the region. Figure 6 shows details of funds provided to each member state during the 
period. 
                                                 
250 Kimunguyi, “Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa,” 15. 
251 Olsen, “Fighting terrorism in Africa by proxy,” 297.  
252 Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Chapter 2. Country Reports on Terrorism: Africa Overview,” 
Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, U.S. Department of State, ,Accessed November 15,2015. 
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253 Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism.” 2013.  
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Figure 6.  PREACT Allocations by Country, Fiscal Years 2009–2013 
 
Source: Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Combating Terrorism: State Department Can 
Improve Management of East Africa Program, (GAO-14-502) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2014), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-502  
In addition to deploying Special Forces troops to assist the AU-RTF, as earlier 
discussed, the United States also passed the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Act 
in May 2009. The act commits the U.S. government to support African Union efforts to 
end LRA atrocities and restore stability in the region affected by the LRA’s 25 years of 
terrorism.2546 Also, Washington provided a reward of $5 million to anyone who would 
lead to the capture of any of the five indicted LRA commanders.255  
In fiscal year (FY) 2010 to FY2013, the United States disbursed $8.5 million to 
UNICEF in support of rehabilitation and integration of ex-LRA abductees in the CAR 
and DRC; between 2010 and 2014, the U.S. had disbursed $8.72 million to assist LRA 
victims in various IDPs in the DRC, CAR and South Sudan.256 As a result of the joint 
effort between the U.S. government and the African Union, the AU-RTF troops have 
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succeeded in paralyzing the LRA. On January 6, 2015, “Brig” Dominic Ongwen, one of 
the two surviving top LRA commanders indicted by the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), surrendered to the AU-RTF forces.257 The Uganda government handed him to the 
ICC for trial.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The employment of a regional strategy in combating terrorism in East Africa has 
been effective in spite of a number of challenges. The AU efforts in coordination with the 
international community have enabled the establishment of a democratically elected 
government in Somalia and a gradual recovery of its state institutions. Despite the 
successes posted, however, the AMISOM force continues to face a number of challenges, 
including inadequate manpower and equipment to liberate and secure all of Somalia and 
continuing Al-Shabaab attacks on the TCCs back home, such as the July 11, 2010, 
bombings in Uganda, the September 13, 2013, Westgate Mall incident in Nairobi, and the 
April 2, 2015, attack on Garrisa University students in Kenya.  
Al-Shabaab continues to infiltrate the liberated areas, exploiting the AMISOM 
extended lines of communication and also lack of well-defined enemy identity, as well as 
inadequate and irregular payment of stipends to Somali National Forces. This situation 
has led to increased desertion; an SNA soldier earns on average $100 a month. Lack of 
effective counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) capabilities, political disharmony, 
and clan politics negatively affect military operations. The capacity of AMISOM forces 
requires enhancement in terms of troop levels, force multipliers, and training to defeat 
Al-Shabaab.  
In spite of the failure by some of the TCCs to contribute troops to the AU-RTF, 
the AU-RTF, with the support of the U.S forces, has made tremendous achievements. Out 
of the five top LRA commanders indicted by the ICC, three have been killed in combat, 
one surrendered and is now arraigned in the ICC, and another was killed on orders of the 
LRA leader, Joseph Kony, who is still eluding the forces. The LRA has consequently lost 
                                                 
257  International Criminal Couty, ”Dominic Ongwen transferred to The Hague,” January 20, 2015, 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr1084.aspx. 
 71 
the ability to launch attacks and abduct civilians in the CAR and DRC. In addition, the 
formation of the UN MONUSCO-IB, comprising regional forces, has been effective in 
dismantling the ADF terrorist camps in the eastern DRC, several of its combatants have 
been killed, and its overall leader captured. On the whole, cooperation among regional 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The perennial instability among Uganda’s neighboring states, coupled with the 
presence of terrorist safe havens across the country’s porous borders, poses a challenge to 
Uganda’s counterterrorism system. Exacerbated by the artificial division of border 
communities by colonialism and the resultant attempts by the state to restrict cross-border 
movements and activities of local communities, conflict is the unhappy norm on 
Uganda’s border regions, which also are rife with such underlying structural weaknesses 
as poor infrastructure and low motivation of border officials. In the late 1990s and mid-
2000s, terrorists exploited the failure of the state to exert effective control over its porous 
borders and caused mayhem. The first line of defense for any country is at its borders. 
Uganda must refocus attention and resources toward more and better border security. At 
the same time, while ensuring security at the borders, the state must balance the benefits 
of economic activities to the nation with security concerns.  
No state unilaterally controls its borders; borders are, by definition, shared 
between two or more states, and their control is a mutual responsibility. For Uganda to 
have a meaningful and effective border control regime, it must strengthen its cooperation 
with its regional neighbors and international allies. Fortunately, Uganda and its East 
African neighbors have done a good job in reinvigorating the EAC, through which 
various mechanisms have been put in place to facilitate trade across borders, including 
the establishment of the OSBPs. More work, however, must be done in terms of 
establishing a coherent security mechanism to guarantee safe borders. Measures to 
improve security at the borders would include conducting regular and well-coordinated 
cross-border security meetings by border authorities, effective mobilization and 
sensitization of border communities on the terrorism threat, and effectively equipping and 
deploying joint border security teams to conduct routine border patrols and surveillance. 
Foremost of all, the countries themselves must be stable and capable of asserting control 
over their borders. Internal stability demands that states address the drivers of their 
instability—ethnic or religious strife, terrorism, poverty, corruption, etc.  
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Despite—or perhaps because of—the security challenges faced by Western 
Europe and the United States, there are lessons of good governance that can be learned by 
Uganda and the region. Though the concept of good governance has varied 
interpretations, generally it includes promotion by state or private organizations of 
freedoms of association of individuals and civil society, rule of law, transparency and 
accountability, harmonizing diverse interests through consensus, equity and inclusiveness 
for all (with a particular focus on minorities), optimal use of resources including the 
preservation of the environment, and accountability and transparency.258 Good 
governance would further strengthen regional cooperation and more effective border 
control. Similarly, more effort should be put in strengthening regional mechanisms, such 
as the ICGLR and the IGAD, to achieve effective cooperation in bolstering border 
security and combating terrorism. Although the basic mechanisms exist in Uganda and 
East Africa today, they still lack the muscle to operate effectively on their own. They lack 
financial independence, and their performance depends on international support. Thus, 
these measures have only slowly and partially addressed the vicious threat of terrorism at 
Uganda’s porous borders.  
Regionalism, multilateralism, and partnership are neither hollow rhetoric aimed at 
attracting international sympathy, nor are they unidirectional fads. The threat of terrorism 
in Uganda and the region at large poses a direct threat to the interests of the western 
world and the rest of the international community. The support from the UN, the EU, and 
the United States to Uganda and East Africa in the fight against terrorism has 
incapacitated both the LRA and ADF terrorists. Al Shabaab, too, has been substantially 
weakened. As a result of a well-coordinated regional approach, Uganda’s borders are 
now safer from terrorism and the other ills caused by or exploited amid porous borders. 
To the extent that stability, prosperity, and democratic progress hinge on an ordered 
frontier, these developments, on the whole, have helped Uganda and the region.   
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Uganda’s combined approach of law enforcement, intelligence, military, and 
diplomatic counterterrorism measures has effectively checked terrorist maneuvers and 
kept the country relatively safe from terrorism in the last decade—save for the July 11, 
2010, incident. However, there is still no guarantee that the status quo will persist. First, 
the national borders remain porous and vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. Second, 
Uganda’s uncompromising stance against terrorism and its frontline position in 
combating it in the region makes the country a prime target for terrorist attacks. Third, 
with increasing use of the Internet, terrorists are able to operate without physically 
crossing borders: they recruit, instruct, fund, and equip their local agents undetected. 
Recently, the media widely reported that by mid-2016, “Facebook (will) beam free 
Internet to Africa with satellites.”259 Individuals and communities in remote areas of 
Sub-Saharan Africa are targeted to benefit, including Uganda. Unfortunately, it will not 
just be cute school kids and eager online shoppers logging on with improved Internet 
access; terrorist networks also will expand their reach in similar proportions. It is 
important, therefore, that Uganda puts in place a formal national counterterrorism 
strategy to address the enduring threat of terrorism. The strategy, among other things, 
would comprehensively address the question of border control and cyber threat.  
Although law enforcement, military, and diplomatic approaches are key to 
Uganda’s terrorism policy, good intelligence deserves special consideration. The security 
of the state depends on the capacity of its intelligence agencies to penetrate terrorist 
networks and collect reliable and timely information about terrorist intentions. Given its 
unstable neighboring states, Uganda must effectively facilitate its intelligence apparatus 
as an essential element in securing the country’s border regions. Resources for human 
and modern technical intelligence assets must have access and be deployed to the entry 
points and strategic areas along the porous borders. At the same time, Uganda should 
continue its democratic intelligence reforms to ensure the democracy, transparency, and 
accountability of its intelligence operations.  
                                                 
259 Heather Kelly, “Facebook to Beam Free Internet to Africa with Satellites,” CNN Money, October 
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To achieve democratic control, existing mechanisms of civilian control over 
intelligence must be enhanced to have an efficient national intelligence system. In 
addition, intelligence should focus at higher levels of professionalization through 
training; improved skills in research and analysis; integration of young, well-qualified 
civilian staff; and better resourced intelligence collection systems. As Uganda reforms its 
anti-terrorism laws to support law enforcement efforts in countering terrorism, the need 
for more effective legislative oversight of intelligence becomes more apparent. Enhanced 
intelligence control will check possible abuse of the law and also improve information 
sharing and cooperation among JIC members. A combination of improved community 
policing and intelligence in the border region will minimize the problem of porous 
borders. 
To implement the above reforms, Uganda must consider providing funding in its 
national budget. For example, to establish and operationalize a national counterterrorism 
terrorism strategy, resources would be required to fund diverse requirements, including 
creating supporting structures with their component parts (personnel, logistics, and office 
accommodation, etc.). Similarly, to reform intelligence, the intelligence community 
would require funds to hire well-qualified civilian personnel, funding of human and 
technical assets, and training at different levels. An appropriate legislative oversight 
mechanism should be put in place to ensure transparency and accountability of the funds, 
but without compromising the efficiency and security of the agencies.  
Most important, to counter terrorism effectively, Uganda must address such 
structural constraints as poverty and unemployment. Though many scholars deny the 
relationship between poverty and terrorism on grounds that several terrorists, personally, 
hail from middle- and high-income backgrounds, it is also true, particularly in third world 
countries like Uganda, that terrorists recruit desperate youth by luring them with false 
promises of jobs and attractive pay—or simply easier answers. Addressing the problem 
of youth unemployment will not only deny terrorists ground for recruitment, but also 
contribute to a productive population. A productive and stable population in a porous 
border region could be relied upon by the state in establishing local security mechanisms 
to check infiltration by terrorists. 
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Arguably, because of Uganda’s geopolitical location as a land-locked country, its 
borders will remain more or less porous; the way forward is to evolve systems that will 
manage this porosity to the benefit of law and order in Uganda. Good governance, an 
enhanced security system, and a well-coordinated regional and international cooperation 
framework would mitigate the dilemma of porous borders in Uganda. 
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